ABSTRACT

The term goal which we take to refer generally to cognitions prospective of desired outcomes, has no agreed delimitation (cf. Cody and McLaughlin, 1990; D'Andrade, 1987; Harré, Clarke, and De Carlo, 1985; Schank and Abelson, 1977; Tracy & Coupland, in press). There is little consensus as to where we are to locate goals, more locally or more globally, in the structure of interaction. Also, goals can relate to diverse dimensions of outcomes, addressing task, identity, and relational concerns. However we choose to use the concept, goals are empirically elusive. They are neither reliably reproducible outside of the immediate contexts of their employment (but see Cegala et al., 1988; Waldron, Cegala, Sharkey, & Teboul, in press) nor, therefore, amenable to direct observation. This is not to say that goals may not be stable, objectifiable, and representable. We assume that they may be, but only when formulated at a particular level of generality and under conditions of idealization. And then, what is reported as a goal, even by its holder, may be a gross representation of the complex of processes to which behaviors (such as talk) systematically relate. The relationship of goals to discourse cannot, in any case, be captured in any simple formulation, particularly given that discourse is rightly characterized as an active, thoroughly constitutive medium (Fowler, 1985) that is likely to subvert pre-existent goals and to impose as much as to fulfil a goal agenda.