ABSTRACT
There are various contexts in which the viewer has the sensation of being "in the film," a sensation characteristically experienced by the natural audience of the traditional feature film. As a viewer I do not only entertain the illusion that I am present in the scene-the diegetic effect-I may even feel that to a greater or lesser degree the adventures of the protagonists are actually happening to me. This experience can take many different forms, which makes it somewhat difficult to describe. In La Peau Douce (1964) we fill in Nicole's thoughts after Lachenay has turned his back on her in the street in order to keep their love secret. We have a different experience, when Reuven is struck full in the face by a baseball in The Chosen (1981); we almost feel as if we ourselves are the victim. And watching King Kong (1933), one sympathizes with both the girl and the huge gorilla as the animal majestically undergoes his fate, amid a rain of bullets fired by stupid, insensitive human beings. In describing such experiences, people often speak of identification or empathy. Although based on the diegetic effect, these phenomena are clearly distinct from it. It is quite conceivable, for example, that the illusion of being present in the fictional world is absolute without the viewer experiencing any appreciable involvement with the events taking place on the screen. The exact meaning of the terms identification and empathy differs according to the context and the field of research; the result is an assortment of widely differing concepts commonly referred to by the same name. (For recent surveys
undertaken from a broader perspective, see Schoenmakers, 1988; van Vliet, 1991; and Zillmann, 1991b.)
We are fortunate in being able to examine the phenomena of identification and empathy within quite a limited framework, focusing on viewer emotion and, more particularly, interest. Before doing so, however, we must mention one special manner of participating in a feature film. We all know that it is possible to feel drawn into or borne along by the movement of the camera or the objects in the scene, or by the stream of images created by montage and reinforced by the music; numerous lyrical passages in feature films could be cited as examples. By analogy with the use of music and the visual arts in psychology, it is possible to speak of empathy. Lipps (1906) referred to the total immersion ("projection") of the self in an object as characteristic of total empathy. Michotte (1953/1991) used the term "motor empathy" for the imitation of the rhythmic movements observed on the screen. (For a general overview, see also Kreitler & Kreitler, 1972, pp. 264-281) . Following on the terms introduced in chapter 3, A-artefact-empathy may be seen as the opposite of F-fiction-empathy. We will not be examining A empathy here, as this would involve a separate study of not inconsiderable proportions. Moreover, according to our model, the processes of F identification/empathy involved in the viewing of a traditional feature film in themselves make up a large proportion of the determinants of interest.
