ABSTRACT
S p e a k in g generally, it may be said that from 1848 to 1856 in the eastern Caucasus both the Russians and Shamil stood on the defensive ; there were comparatively few engagements of note, none involving very serious losses to either side. Shamil was left in undisturbed possession of western Daghestan, including Avaria, and of the greater part of Tchetchnia ; but, on the other hand, the destruction of Saltee and Gherghébil, the building of forts at Aimiakee, Tsoudakhâr, and other places, and the establishment of permanent staff quarters, with ample barrack accommo dation at suitable strategic points, had greatly lessened the danger of invasion for Russia and the native states subject to her. Prince Vórontsoff, realising that he was not strong enough to deal Muridism a mortal blow in existing conditions, contented himself for the most part with strengthening his lines on all sides pending the advent of a favourable moment for resuming a more active policy, and otherwise devoted his very great abilities and energy to the reform of the civil administration. In this field, necessarily extensive and varied in a country like the
Caucasus, he achieved great and lasting success, and on this his fame as viceroy of the Caucasus must rest. But his military attitude was by no means one of merely pas sive defence, particularly in Tchetchnia, where the ruthless partisan warfare went on as before, varied from time to time by raiding expeditions on a large scale.
