ABSTRACT

The rapid disintegration of the Soviet Union over the course of 1990-1 and the growing ethnic and religious revival that it strengthened in Central Asia had significant consequences for Xinjiang. The preceding two chapters have dealt at lengthwith a forty-two-year period (1949-91) inwhichChinese policy inXinjiang underwent a series of transformations simultaneous with the entrenchment of the goal of integration. Significantly, the various fluctuations in the content of Chinese policy were largely the consequence of internal political and economic developments that then interacted with specific imperatives within the context of Sino-Soviet relations. The PLA’s successful ‘peaceful liberation’ of Xinjiang in 1949 and subsequent effective extension of state power into the region by the mid-1950s enabled the Chinese to negate or exclude incumbent external influences. As Chapter 3 demonstrated, while the PRC was closely aligned with the Soviet Union during this period, Moscow’s influence was far from benign and this was highlighted upon the divergence of Chinese and Soviet imperatives by the late 1950s. Thereafter, from Beijing’s perspective, the primary external threat to Xinjiang was the Soviet Union. Significantly, although the Soviets did encourage or support Uyghur exile groups in Central Asia, it was for the express advancement of Soviet political and strategic imperatives.