ABSTRACT
China’s strategy in Xinjiang and in its relations with the states of Central Asia had been only a partial success over the 1991-5 period. Due to the government’s extension of ‘reform and opening’ the region had experienced economic growth and development that had begun to facilitate Xinjiang’s integration with the national and Central Asian economies. As noted in the previous chapter, the government undertook numerous large-scale infrastructure projects to link Xinjiangmore effectively with China proper and Central Asia. The relative economic success of Xinjiang, however, was underpinned to a significant extent by the central government’s provision of substantial financial support. The combination of increased central government investment in Xinjiang and the extension of greater economic freedoms to the province attracted increased Han in-migration. To a significant degree this strategy was reaffirmed over the 1996-2001 period. However, the increased cross-border linkages generated by the state’s ‘double opening’ strategy and the inter-ethnic tension created by greater Han in-migration played a major role in stimulating ethnic minority opposition. Moreover, the state’s connection of internal unrest with the influence of Islam and external forces resulted in the implementation of a more hard-line approach toward religion in the region.
