ABSTRACT
The task before the Carter and Reagan administrations was formidable, yet clear. The United States needed explicit military cooperation from countries alienated by America’s position on the Arab-Israeli conflict and disappointed in Washington’s ineffectual response to the chaos in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia and Oman were not averse to improving their military ties with the United States. Yet, the Saudis in particular did not want to be dependent upon America for their own security needs, nor were they willing to allow any extensive cooperation to be publicized for fear of popular opposition and backlash. The Kuwaitis, on the other hand, were opposed to explicit cooperation with Washington. They preferred to purchase arms from both the Soviets and the West and resisted the presence of any foreign power in the Gulf. And therein lay an inherent conflict between the Carter Doctrine and the political realities in the Gulf; for if the RDF were to provide the United States with a credible military capability—one that was sufficiently powerful and visible to deter the Soviets or local aggressors—it required regional access, if not a permanent presence.
