ABSTRACT
Weber’s conception of the place of values in social science involves several different claims, which are partly independent of one another. This is often concealed by discussions which ascribe to him a single, general position called ‘value-freedom’. So we begin by outlining the six main elements which together constitute Weber’s view of the relation between values and social science. First, value-judgments, which he defines as ‘practical evaluations of the unsatisfactory or satisfactory character of phenomena subject to our influence’, cannot be logically derived from factual statements (Weber, 1949, p. 1). Thus the social sciences, which are concerned with factual descriptions and explanations, cannot establish the truth or falsity of any value-judgment. Second, social scientists should not make value-judgments, in either their teaching or their writing. Weber emphasizes that this is itself a value-judgment. Third, social scientists are necessarily committed to the scientific values of truth, objectivity, and so on. Fourth, it is important to study other people’s values, since these may often be significant causal determinants of their actions; and it is possible to do this without the social scientist’s own values distorting such studies. Fifth, we need some way of selecting objects of investigation from the infinitely complex concrete reality that confronts us. This we do by reference to the relationship that parts of this reality have to one or more different values. But to select objects in this way, by their value-relevance, does not mean that we make favourable value-judgments about either the objects selected, or the values to which they are related. Sixth, once this selection is made, neither valuerelevance nor value-judgments have any further function in the investigation. The process of causal explanation must, and can, be guided solely by the objective canons of scientific argument and evidence.
