ABSTRACT
The investigation of opposition to the Ottoman government in the second half of the nineteenth century has allowed for a special perspective on the political history of the Tanzimat. Apart from the class of high functionaries, who pretended to run the state in an exclusive manner, other groups have come into view that were politically active during this period. By participating in secret societies and opposition groups (as well as by other activities that have not been in the focus of this study) they tried to protect public interest as they understood it and influence the political process accordingly. Secret societies opened a way to politics in a system that excluded many on account of their low rank or their group’s standing in the political system. Most active in the conspiracies were the low-ranking officials, officers
from the military and, to a lesser degree, religious officials. Especially the officials from the civil bureaucracy and the military men were the products of the reform process. Both had been educated in modern schools and looked for a way to express their political ideas. While the civil bureaucracy acted as the vanguard, individuals from the military only entered politics later, perhaps because of their closer connection to the person of the sultan. Only in opposition to Abdülhamid at the end of the century did they come to play a dominant role. Religious officials who likewise had lost much of their political influence at the beginning of the reform era were important in the conspiracies as connectors to the people and especially the medrese students. The issues of legitimacy that fuelled opposition and the political style that
it used offered an opportunity to thematise key aspects of Ottoman political culture in the second half of the nineteenth century. Two of the main questions of legitimacy at stake concerned the redefinition of the sultan’s role in the political system and that of religion for the empire’s legitimacy. Although for much of the Tanzimat period the real influence the sultan had on politics was very limited, this restriction hardly touched upon the ideal of sultanic authority that remained deeply embedded in political culture. Groups like the Society of Martyrs or the Young Ottomans supported this authority against the Tanzimat politicians who were their main target
of opposition. Paradoxically, in doing so they had to exchange the ruling sultan for his successor for they hoped that a new sultan would not be under the tutelage of his ministers any longer. This underlines that it was rather the Ottoman dynasty than the individual sultan that was the focus of loyalty and legitimacy. All the conspiracies were in one way or another connected to the question of succession, which remained a political issue throughout the nineteenth century. The Tanzimat politicians adhered to this logic as well, but in the opposite
way: a sultan under their tutelage was just what they wanted. However, even from among the officials who deposed Abdülaziz and who clearly felt they had a right to rule only Midhat Pasha wanted to restrict sultanic authority by way of a constitution. This amounted to a radical understanding of what purpose a constitution should serve. Such an interpretation was usually not followed by all those who promoted constitutionalist thought. For the Young Ottomans and their successors constitutionalism remained tied to the religious legitimation of Ottoman rule and acted as a modern cipher for political justice. This example shows that religion was still an important medium of
political legitimacy during the Tanzimat, but one that by no means was static or could be used only in reference to the past. That the opposition groups that took the Tanzimat politicians as their main target invoked this legitimacy comes as no surprise. These officials’ reforms were interpreted as concessions to the European powers that were detrimental to the Muslim population of the empire. In the most traditional way the dominant position of Islam was defended by Sheikh Ahmed, who in many ways was an outsider to the political system. However, likewise important was an interpretation of Islam as a source of social justice against the government as it was made popular and expressed in modern language by the Young Ottomans a few years later. This issue was so deeply felt that under the special circumstances of the refugee crisis people like Ali Suavi could seize it to justify opposition against Abdülhamid whose adoption of the cause of Islam had only just begun. The political style of opposition groups in the second half of the nine-
teenth century displayed some general characteristics of Ottoman political culture. One is the importance of personal relationships that take precedence over questions of ideology. All conspiracies formed around a charismatic individual who was able to support and assist his followers. In some instances opposition groups tried to widen their appeal with modern means of communication like leaflets and some of their members were active in the press, but on the whole personal and face-to-face relations were more important as a means of political propaganda. The cultural background of their leaders left a deep imprint on the conspiracies that sometimes emulated other institutions, e.g. the Sufi order as in the case of the Society of Martyrs, the charity organisation as in the case of Vocation or the Freemason lodge as in the case of the Skalieri-Aziz commitee.
