ABSTRACT
Dealing with individuals and networks that have become powerful from wartime economic opportunities is a central challenge for peacemaking. These actors benefit from armed violence and insecurity, and believe “that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interest” (Stedman 1997: 5). They have the leverage to undermine a peace process, but can also be essential to peacemaking if they decide to stop opposing peace and accept the fundamental change necessary to move away from armed violence and criminality. The strategies to deal with these so-called ‘spoilers’ usually involve two options: on the one hand confrontation with superior armed force or the rule of law, and on the other hand co-option into a new post-conflict order or society (Yannis 2003: 184; Wennmann 2005: 488-91). However, neither confrontation nor co-option is without risks and limitations, and often does not foster a lasting peace.
