ABSTRACT
The media and political backdrops of the 2003 Duma elections were very different from the conditions that prevailed during the previous round of parliamentary elections in 1999. Compared to President Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin was a popular leader who provided many public goods demanded by Russian voters. As president, Putin’s approval rating had hovered around 70 per cent throughout his first term. 1 During Putin’s first four years in office the Russian economy had experienced more growth than in the previous decade (McFaul and Petrov 2004: 23). Whether this was due to the president’s economic reforms or to high oil prices was incidental; Putin was given the credit. After a decade of revolutionary change and chaotic upheaval in the nineties, Putin had delivered the stability craved by many Russians. Between 2000 and 2003, television outlets that had opposed Putin during the previous election cycle, or that had attempted to frustrate his consolidation of power, were brought under the influence of the state. Given the circumstances, it is hard to imagine that United Russia, the political party most closely affiliated with President Putin, could fail to win the 2003 Duma race. Yet, in the lead up to the election it became apparent that United Russia was failing to capture the necessary public attention to secure an outright majority. The predictable political system constructed during Putin’s first term was of little interest to Russian voters. The lack of public interest in the Duma campaign presented a problem for Putin, as the outcome of the race would have ramifications for the presidency. The December 2003 Duma elections offered President Putin an opportunity to formalise his control over the last remaining potential checks on his power – the State Duma and the independent political parties that worked within it. In the wake of the 1999 Duma elections, the KPRF had emerged as the largest parliamentary faction; yet the party held only a modest 25 per cent of seats. The Communists were outnumbered in the Duma by centrist deputies who – although ideologically similar – were divided into rival parties, loyal to opposing elites. The centrist party Unity had been formed in 1999 as an election vehicle to support Putin. In that year’s Duma elections, Unity was opposed by Fatherland-All Russia, which was led by former Russian Prime Minister Evgeny Primakov and Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, both considered likely rivals to Putin in the 2000 presidential race. Despite lacking a formal parliamentary majority, President
Putin found it relatively straightforward to get his legislation approved by the Duma. Using Unity as an intermediary, Putin built coalitions to support his bills (Remington 2001: 294-5). Putin was willing to cooperate with any faction, working with the KPRF to amend the law on political parties and pro-reform deputies to introduce new tax rates and other measures to liberalise the economy (Remington 2003: 40-2). After the merger between Unity and Fatherland in April 2001, Putin came to enjoy majority support in the Duma. The formation of United Russia in April 2002 forced a revision of Duma committee chairmanships, pushing the KPRF out of positions of influence. In order to keep their positions, some Communist leaders – including Deputy Duma Chairman Gennady Selyeznev – chose to defect from the KPRF to the ruling party, further weakening parliamentary opposition to the executive (Remington 2003: 50-2). However, given the president’s overwhelming upper hand, the KPRF went from the executive’s most active antagonist in the Duma to a relatively reliable junior partner (Ryabov 2004a: 102). Likewise, although the policies of SPS and the president were not always the same, the neo-liberal party only criticised Putin’s agenda in certain areas, such as military reform (Gelman 2005: 238). Even with such encouraging trends, the president and his administration feared that the new cooperative relationship between the legislature and executive was far from stable. Support for the president’s legislation would last only as long as he commanded authority in society. Political fortunes in Russia, as elsewhere, can change rapidly: in 1996, buoyed by victory in the presidential election, Boris Yeltsin achieved previously unrivalled levels of accommodation with the KPRF-controlled Duma, yet by 1999 the same Duma came close to impeaching him (Remington 2003: 39). Less than six months prior to polling, United Russia’s eventual victory in the 2003 election was far from assured. 2 A public opinion survey conducted by the Levada Center in July 2003 found United Russia and the KPRF neck-and-neck, each receiving support from approximately 20 per cent of voters. 3 The election of an uncooperative Duma in December 2003 held several latent dangers for President Putin. An oppositional Duma could widen the gap between public expectations towards the president and what the president could actually achieve – jeopardising Putin’s smooth re-election in March 2004 and his succession in 2008 (Waterman et al . 1999: 945-6). The 2003 election had the potential to set the agenda and act as a primary for the more significant presidential election the following year. Furthermore, despite the constitutional weakness of the Russian parliament relative to the presidency, the Duma’s organisational resources – its communications office and staff – could be utilised by the majority faction to mount a future election campaign against Putin and his supporters. When United Russia became the largest faction in the Duma in April 2002, its leaders began to appoint their own people to replace existing officials working in the Duma administration. This practice was intensified when United Russia leader and Interior Minister Boris Gryzlov became Duma chairman after the 2003 election. By early 2004, two-thirds of the Duma’s press officers were new, with the majority transferring with Gryzlov from the Interior Ministry. 4
Even without a majority granting control of the Duma’s resources, a parliamentary presence affords opposition parties an opportunity to be covered by the media. Over 1,300 Russian journalists are accredited to work in the State Duma, with deputies also at liberty to invite journalists to meet with them at the legislature. 5 While the decision-making process within the presidential administration has become ever more shrouded in secrecy, the Duma’s activities represent one way in which Russian politics remains public. Press officers in the parliamentary administration refer to the Duma as ‘the door to the street’, as the number of journalists, opposition politicians and party officials working in the Duma makes it impossible to control the flow of information. 6 By virtue of its constitutional and institutional significance, the State Duma cannot legitimately be ignored by the mass media. Despite an increase in state influence over the television sector under President Putin, ‘all major channels continue – to a greater or lesser extent – to report on the main developments in the Duma’. 7
A strong showing in the 2003 elections would have provided opposition parties with a public platform – albeit a limited one – from which to explain their ideas and level criticism at the president and his government. The Putin administration’s strategy in the 2003 election, therefore, consisted of three parts: first, to maximise support for United Russia; second, to marginalise the parliamentary presence of parties opposed to President Putin; and third, to secure a two-thirds parliamentary majority for parties in support of the president, thereby providing enough votes to pass a bill changing the Russian constitution. Television channels under the influence of the state were the main instruments through which the presidential administration sought to achieve its strategic ends.
