Introduction

This book examines the relationship between presidential power and the national television media in Russia during the presidency of Vladimir Putin. The importance of television in post-Soviet politics is rooted in a number of factors. Television dominates the Russian media market in part because broadcasting was actively developed as a propaganda tool by the Soviets (McNair 1991; Mickiewicz 1988; Lendvai 1981). By the end of 1995, television was available in 98.8 per cent of Russian households (Internews 1997). In post-Soviet Russia, television has expanded rapidly, while the Russian print media have declined as a result of economic and infrastructure problems created by the transition to a market economy (Oates and Helvey 2000: 31). In addition, television’s rise to prominence stems from the deeply held belief among members of the Russian political elite that the medium has an almost unlimited capacity for persuasion (Mickiewicz 2000: 109). Television is considered a vital resource for those who wish to gain or retain political power. As a consequence of elite interest in television as a means of political influence, the development of media freedom and editorial autonomy in post-Soviet Russia has largely followed a negative course. In the early 1990s, the development of an autonomous and pluralist television sector was proclaimed as one of the successes of Russia’s transition to democracy (Konovchenko and Kiselev 2004; Belin 2002b; Zassoursky 1999). In 1993, the freedom of the Russian media became constitutionally guaranteed. 1 The end of censorship and state monopoly on media ownership allowed a multiplicity of viewpoints to be publicly expressed. Market reforms instigated after the collapse of communism stimulated the growth of privately owned media, including first and foremost, television (McFaul 2001b: 323). Throughout the 1990s, private television networks demonstrated their independence from the state with frequent criticism of the first Russian President Boris Yeltsin. Although more often the by-product of information wars between competing elites than the result of a commitment to independent journalism, Russian television provided audiences with a plurality of opinions during the Yeltsin era (Zassoursky 2001: 161). Critical coverage of the first war in Chechnya confirmed the reputation of private broadcasters as a serious and independent alternative to state-controlled television. By the end of Vladimir Putin’s presidency in May 2008, the position of the Russian national television media had undergone a dramatic change. Television

channels that challenged Putin over controversial issues – such as the sinking of the Kursk submarine, terrorist attacks in Moscow and the ongoing war in Chechnya – were subjected to a variety of sanctions. In April 2001, NTV – Russia’s most popular private television network – fell under the control of its main creditor, the partly state-owned gas giant Gazprom. The following January, the Moscow Arbitration Court ordered the liquidation of the commercial channel TV6, ruling that it could no longer operate owing to its mounting debts. The case against TV6 was brought by a minority shareholder, LUKoil-Garant, a subsidiary of LUKoil, a company with close links to the Putin administration (Romanova 2001). A similar fate befell TVS, which was shut down by order of the Media Ministry in June 2003 (Glikin 2003b). By the end of Putin’s presidency, all major national television channels were under the direct or indirect control of the state. 2

Developments in the national television sector since 2000 have been viewed by the majority of analysts in both Russia and the West as a retreat from the pluralism of the Yeltsin era, and a sign of increasingly authoritarian state control of the media (Dzyaloshinsky 2001; Usacheva 2000; Becker 2004; Fish 2005; McFaul and Goldgeier 2006). However, although it cannot be denied that government influence over the television media increased from 2000, claims that editorial freedom declined because Putin was more authoritarian than Yeltsin are overly simplistic and exaggerate the worst features of the new media environment. Although Putin’s policy of centralisation reduced the plurality of voices heard on Russian television, his control of the airwaves was far from absolute and varied across channels, topics and time. Applying broad labels to the media system that emerged under Putin risks not only a misconception of the media environment in Russia, but also a false reading of the wider political system that has developed since 2000. A degree of imperfect pluralism continued to exist in the Russian television sector throughout Putin’s presidency. Putin did not oppose all forms of media pluralism or criticism of his government and administration, but sought to impose a framework of state control over the national television media, within which there continued to exist a defined space for dissent and debate. Putin did not seek to increase government influence over the media purely as a mechanism of political domination, but also as a means of overcoming the dysfunctional power structure inherited from his predecessor. During the Yeltsin era, the fragmentation of political power allowed elites hostile to the president to sabotage his political agenda. On assuming office, Putin quickly signalled that the rules of the political game had changed. Criminal proceedings were brought against media-owning oligarchs whose outlets opposed Putin’s political programme. His own victory in the 2000 presidential election had shown Putin the power of the media and made him determined that such a powerful weapon should not remain in the hands of the oligarchs (Belin 2002a: 4). 3 Henceforth, the government would not refrain from controlling media content. Moreover, the authorities would shut down any media organisation that did not accept Putin’s new rules. The coercive measures employed by the Kremlin against media outlets and their owners opposed to Putin minimised visible conflict among the Russian

elites. From 2002, Russia experts such as Vladimir Gelman, Anton Steen and Andrei Ryabov began to herald a new era of elite consensus in Russian politics (Steen 2003b; Gelman 2002; Ryabov 2002). Gelman writes: ‘By mid-2002 elite dissent in Russia’s national politics – at least at the behavioural level – had been significantly minimized, if not eliminated. The label of “imposed consensus” seems to be appropriate for evaluation of such developments’ (Gelman 2003: 32). Gelman characterises elite consensus in Russia as ‘imposed’ because elite actors either agreed to be subordinate to the president or were targeted by Putin (Gelman 2003: 45). Yet the idea of an elite consensus – imposed or otherwise – ignores the often virulent disputes that have frequently polarised sections of the elite since 2002, including factional fights within Putin’s own administration. This book demonstrates that although Putin succeeded in reducing elite conflict – which had paralysed the state in the 1990s – he did not manage to put an end to such struggles completely. During his first term, Putin was able to consolidate his power by balancing the interests of various competing elites. Putin’s presidential power came to rest on his position as arbiter and final adjudicator of disputes between rival elite factions, not only within his administration, but also among the wider political and economic elite. A diversity of interests and opinions within the Russian elite continues to generate a degree of political discussion and debate on national television. Far from acting as a break on his power, a limited degree of plurality in the television sector was an asset to Putin, allowing him to co-opt a broad range of political positions, while retaining his manoeuvrability between, and independence from, Russia’s various competing elites. Yet the cumulative effect of government encroachment on media autonomy from 2000 also yielded unintended consequences for Putin. Social theorist Bertrand Russell defines power as ‘the production of intended effects’ (Russell 1938: 25). By Russell’s definition, for a person to be powerful the outcomes of power must be the intended outcomes. Political theorist Joel Feinberg offers a similar way of conceiving the relationship between power and intention; for Feinberg the outcomes of power must serve the interests of power (Feinberg 1984: 34). This book will show that, to some extent, Putin’s reconstruction of the television sector did not serve the interests of his power as president. Media manipulation has created a gulf between Russia’s leaders and its citizens. Television has become predominantly a one-way channel of communication, denying the president a true understanding of what is happening in society. As the gap between the president and the population grows, so does the potential for political instability, thus creating an impetus for ever-increasing government control of the media (Ryabov 2003; Lipman 2004b). The declining visibility of political opposition to Putin – most notably in the 2004 presidential election – called into question the legitimacy of his presidential power. Furthermore, cut off from societal demands, in his second term, policy-making by the Putin administration lost its early dynamism (Åslund 2005a). In terms of his ability to exercise presidential power therefore, increased control over the television media proved a double-edged sword for President Putin.