ABSTRACT
In March 2000, Vladimir Putin cruised to victory in a presidential election that was seen by many as a foregone conclusion (Rutland 2000: 315). 1 In parliamentary elections the previous December, parties led by Putin’s main political rivals – former Prime Minister Evgeny Primakov and Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov – had fared poorly. 2 In contrast, Putin’s popularity was bolstered by the success of Unity, the party receiving his endorsement prior to the election (McFaul 2000b; Brundy 2001). At the end of 1999, however, the presidential elections were six months away, and – as demonstrated by the 1996 election – six months was a sufficient length of time for political fortunes to be reversed. This all changed with Boris Yeltsin’s resignation from the presidency on the eve of the millennium. Under the terms of the Russian constitution, Prime Minister Putin became acting president and the presidential election that was scheduled for June 2000 was brought forward to 26 March. With the election moved, there was little chance that Primakov, Luzhkov or any other serious contender would appear to challenge Putin. Although ten presidential challengers to Putin did managed to register in time for the early poll, only two were credible national figures: Communist Party (KPRF) leader Gennady Zyuganov and Yabloko leader Grigory Yavlinsky. Zyuganov, Yeltsin’s main rival in 1996, became the main opponent of his chosen successor. Yet at the beginning of the official election campaign on 3 March 2000, support for Zyuganov was at just 17 per cent. 3
While the ultimate outcome of the presidential race was never in doubt, the margin of Putin’s victory was unpredictable. Electoral support for Putin during March 2000 averaged 47 per cent, not quite enough to secure outright victory in the first round of voting. 4 To secure a strong mandate for his political agenda required Putin to win in a single round. Two obstacles stood in the way of a quick victory for Putin. Ironically, the first hurdle was his dominance in the opinion polls. Putin’s lead created a sense of inevitability about the outcome of the election that his team feared would suppress turnout (Lambroschini 2000b). Russian election law requires a turnout of 50 per cent of registered voters for the result of an election to be valid. In covering the presidential campaign, television channels helped Putin to win in a single round by employing tactics to increase voter turnout. A few small anti-Putin groups called upon voters to boycott the election
so that new elections would have to be called in June. Ivan Zassoursky, the leader of one such movement, Osvod, claimed a boycott was the only way for citizens to affect the result of the election:
It seems to me that if elections didn’t take place and if it were possible to spoil them that would make it possible to lead an election campaign as scheduled. All the questions that were silenced now [would be asked], including about the war [in Chechnya] that hasn’t been shown because the state holds a very firm control over the stations.
