ABSTRACT
Popper is perhaps best known for his anti-inductivism, if not for his emphasis on falsifi cation; for his view that the success of science does not depend on inductive inferences (because the scientifi c method does not require them).1 For Popper, what matters in science is what we do with theories when we get them (or the so-called ‘context of justifi cation’) rather than how we come up with those theories in the fi rst place (or the so-called ‘context of discovery’). In short, it is irrelevant whether one arrives at a theory by drinking several pints of beer and being very imaginative or by thinking in an inductive way (consciously or unconsciously), e.g. by generalizing from a small number of instances. Origin is irrelevant to judging the worth of a theory. What matters are features such as (empirical) accuracy, internal consistency, and scope (or what Popper calls ‘empirical content’). And whether a theory possesses these can be judged when it is already on the table.2 In Popper’s own words:
The question how it happens that a new idea occurs to a man-whether it is a musical theme, a dramatic confl ict, or a scientifi c theory-may be of great interest to empirical psychology; but it is irrelevant to the logical analysis of scientifi c knowledge. (1959, pp. 30-31)
Naturally, one might criticise one’s own ideas before publicly expressing them (whether scientist or not); and indeed, it is often wise to do so. But this process should not be confused with the idea’s genesis, or the process by which it is brought before the (conscious) mind for the fi rst time. It is this genesis that Popper suggests is epistemologically irrelevant. Using an apt academic analogy, Miller (1994, ch. 1) avers that we should have no entry requirements, but should have stringent and rigorous expulsion procedures.
