ABSTRACT
In this chapter I intend to raise two questions. First, is there any place left for conscientious objection (CO) in liberal democracy? Second, if there is any such place, which claims to CO may be accepted? Together, the two questions concern the problem of the justification of CO. In tackling the first question I will show that, despite appearances to the contrary, there is indeed some room, albeit interstitial, for CO to be raised within the framework of liberal democracy. However, finding such room does not ipso facto provide a justification for CO. Quite the opposite, indeed: the argument shows that no proper justification can be put forward for CO in general. Yet, given its general commitment to religious liberty and freedom of conscience, liberal democracy sits uneasily with an outright rejection of CO. But then further argument is needed to show which qualifications can make CO claims more or less acceptable. The answer to the second question is meant to single out qualifications which both add normative strength to CO claims and account for actual political decisions to grant or withhold them.
