ABSTRACT
The debate relating to the origin and content of jus cogens norms suggests the term is more an academic convenience than a legal reality. An alternative perspective is to blend both views and recognise that the academic reality of these so-called non-derogable norms (that in fact are often derogated from) means that it is more accurate to describe jus cogens as a legal convenience. This is because the jus cogens doctrine gives form to an indeterminate body of substantive law by reconciling the otherwise uncertain relationship between fundamental principles and other rules of public international law. In other words, and the approach taken here, jus cogens can be seen as a vehicle, fi rst, to articulate that certain fundamental rules of public international law are increasingly recognised as requiring protection and, secondly, to illustrate that in practice there is political and moral will in favour of protecting such norms. On that basis, there is no need to resolve the debate surrounding jus cogens or to adopt a normative conception of jus cogens in the scope of this work.
