ABSTRACT
Automatic mental processes have captured the attention of cognitive andthen social psychologists, and even more recently, the general public(e.g., Gladwell, 2005). These processes are known to operate outside of conscious awareness and control, be triggered spontaneously by the mere perception of even the most minimal stimulus, and proceed to completion without effort or attention (e.g., Bargh, 1994, 1997; Neely, 1977; Schiffrin & Schneider, 1977). Of particular interest and importance to social psychologists, fundamental intergroup processes also have automatic components. Compelling demonstrations have been made of the automaticity of attitude activation-that evaluations of objects, concepts, people, and even social groups occur rapidly, spontaneously, and unintentionally (e.g., Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992; Bargh, Chaiken, Raymond, & Hymes, 1996; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Fazio, Sanbonmatzu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986). On the cognitive side, research building on theories and methodologies relating to memory and mental construct activation (Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977; Meyer & Schevaneveldt, 1971; Neely, 1977) has revealed that beliefs, and specifically stereotypes, can be activated automatically (e.g., Banaji & Hardin, 1996; Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982; Blair & Banaji, 1996; Dovidio, Evans, & Tyler, 1986). Automatic components of behavior too have been demonstrated, some behaviors being more benign (e.g., Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996, found that subliminally priming people with thoughts of the elderly caused them to walk more slowly) than others (e.g., Correll, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2002; and Greenwald, Oakes, & Hoffman, 2003, found that people tend to shoot Black men holding guns faster than White men holding guns in a speeded computer simulation).
