ABSTRACT
This means that even when the rebellion aims to address grievances, or in other words deprivations, people tend to act rationally, as described by Smelser with the term ‘opportunities’4 to rebel. This is largely equivalent with Gurr’s concept of coercive balance, where the denial of opportunities for rebellion, through coercion, reduces the likelihood of rebellion.5 Collier’s perspective leads to the undesirable consequences that: first, only economic deprivations are taken into account; and second, that root causes that produce dispossession and deprivation are not addressed. Additionally, the point of reference for rational choices may change with the relevance of ideology, where value-rational behaviour derives from ideals and identities on which as a second step instrumentally rational behaviours seek to achieve these values. To put it simply: ideologies might shift the values pursued away from the original cause of deprivation; the mobilizing effect of deprivation is given direction by the ideology. Lootseeking behaviour, even understood in abstract terms (for example, as the fight for political power), is often insufficient to explain derivative threats (for example, the killing of civilians), while when looking through the lens of ideology these actions become understandable in value-rational terms. For example, the Mumbai attacks of 26 and 27 November 2008, which exclusively targeted civilians in public places, cannot be explained by loot-seeking behaviour unless one treats television coverage time as a commodity to be looted. Even if one thinks of terrorism as communication, the motives, and therefore the message, remain unclear. Gurr describes the different degrees of political violence as dependent on the amount of violence conducted by a faction and the number of people involved in such a movement:
Turmoil: Relatively spontaneous, unorganized political violence with substantial popular participation, including violent political strikes, riots, political clashes, and localized rebellions.
