ABSTRACT
In this book we have reviewed research integrating two literaturesorganizational justice and affect. After a historical introduction and definition of key terms (Chapter 1), we turned our attention to the cognitive models of affect and how these pertain to social justice (Chapter 2). As we saw, work linking justice and affect is well known to fairness scholars, for affect has long been an important part of two venerable theories of justice-Adam’s (1963; 1965) equity theory, and Folger’s (1986a; 1986b; 1987; 1993) referent cognitions theory. Beyond this, we found that a number of researchers followed the pioneering work of Montada (1994; Montada & Schneider, 1989; Reichle & Montada, 1994) and Mikula, Scherer, and Athenstaedt (1998), using the cognitive appraisal perspective on emotions in order to understand justice evaluations (e.g., Barclay, Skarlicki, & Pugh, 2005; Krehbiel & Cropanzano, 2000; Tepper, 2001; Weiss, Suckow, & Cropanzano, 1999). The cognitive appraisal models reviewed in our second chapter treat fairness rather generically. That is, these frameworks focus less on distinct motives that drive justice concerns. Such motives might include one’s moral duty, desire to maintain control, and a concern with one’s standing in social groups.
