ABSTRACT
Is, by the same token, disloyalty perhaps not in all instances a vice? The whistleblower, for instance, is apparently acting disloyally but, provided he has the right reasons, clearly justified in doing so (ibid. 204, 215). We deem him for that reason, if he indeed acts on good grounds, not a disloyal person, i.e., not as someone willing, or even tending, to betray, deceive, desert, or let down. It seems that having a disloyal character cannot be seen as anything else but a severe defect – to most people, a disloyal Nazi will seem even more contemptible than a loyal one (see also Ewin 1992). However, can it consistently be held that acting disloyally is not always a vice, while being a disloyal person clearly is a bad thing? Is the whistleblower’s conduct disloyal in the first place? Possibly, some of the confusion here may disappear to some extent by not seeing loyalty and disloyalty as opposites on the same dimension, as two excesses we have to find a mean between, but on two distinct continuums. The opposite of acting loyal (and being a loyal person) is the absence of loyalty in someone’s deeds and character, i.e., the absence of the tendency to suspend judgment and to side with someone or something more or less unquestioningly. Someone never led by loyalty might be a strange creature, but not per se morally flawed. Likewise, the opposite of disloyalty is not loyalty but not being disloyal, that is: not betraying the persons who trust you. Seen in that light, the whistleblower is not being disloyal, but someone who is not led (astray) by loyalty, in this case to his employer. A similar line of reasoning might also hold true for conscientious objectors, and maybe even for Mr. Princen. His case does illustrate how difficult it nonetheless is to draw the distinctions; one could say that his refusal to take part in the police actions, and thus his desertion, testify of a healthy lack of loyalty, but did his shooting at former colleagues not amount to disloyalty?
