ABSTRACT
This book examines the strategic approaches and the character of relationships among three major players in the Himalayan-South Asian region since 1947/49. I argue that a strategic triangle exists among the three. It emerged in the early 1960s and it was the culmination of two bilateral conflicts, Indo-Pakistani and Sino-Indian that involved diplomatic rivalry, conflicting worldviews, and war. The relations among the three have evolved – from diplomatic rivalry to war, and later from war to strategic discourse, but the three have been tied together. The evolution reveals two trends – from diplomatic rivalry to the formation of triangularity that was inspired by the policies of China and Pakistan. India has been a latecomer as a participant in triangular strategic politics but once it joined the game the three players have found it difficult to disengage themselves from it. Hence this triangular pattern of alignments and interactions has developed an institutional and a robust character in a geo-politically sensitive part of world politics. The first trend led to the formation of a tight strategic triangle in the early 1960s that was similar to the period of tight and tense bipolarity between the superpowers during the Cold War. The second trend has evolved since the late 1980s; it represents the current pattern of relationships among the three, and here the three members of the triangle have taken steps, by way of reciprocal action, to tone down the conflictual relationships, to build strategic dialogues and to find common economic and political ground even though the military competition has continued among them. I call the second trend a period of loose triangularity. The formation of the strategic triangle was based on different historical,
diplomatic, and leadership imperatives for each country. For China the history of rivalry between imperial (Manchu) China, British India, Russia and Tibet gave its southern policy a geo-political focus that was core to the actions of the Chinese communists vis-à-vis the Tibetans and the Indians after 1949. The pre-1949 experiences were cast in triangular terms, for example, in the interactions between Manchu China, Tibet and British India, and at times between China, Tibet and Russia. Beijing’s leaders also understood the importance of strategic triangles from their internal civil war that brought them to power. They dealt with the US-Kuomintang-communist triangle
during the civil war in the 1940s and the KMT-Japan-Chinese communist triangle in the 1930s. Communist China’s ideology and diplomacy recognizes that it cannot pursue its interests unaided. Mao argued. ‘China’s strength alone will not be sufficient, and we shall also have to rely on the support of international forces or otherwise we shall not be able to win; this adds to China’s tasks in international propaganda and diplomacy’.1
