ABSTRACT
It is widely believed that Israel was the first state in the Middle East to pursue in large scale an independent nuclear program including land, air, and sea based delivery systems for deploying nuclear weapons. The threat perceived by Arab and non-Arab countries in the Middle East as a result of the Israeli build-up of conventional and non-conventional armament has initiated counter armament programs, which has further undermined stability in the Middle East. The recent Iranian drive to acquire nuclear capability has sparked great concern all over the region, and to some extent turned the world’s attention away from Israel’s nuclear arsenal and the very serious challenges it poses for peace and stability in the region. Since the creation of Israel in 1948, the security policies implemented by successive Israeli governments have conformed to a number of fundamental principles. Although these principles have been formulated with a conventional type of encounter in mind, their wider framework helps to explain the strategic reasoning behind the Israeli quest for a nuclear deterrent as well. For example, when extended to the nuclear field the conventional military doctrine of “strategic defense and operational offense” gives rationale for a mixture of preemptive, preventive, and retaliatory actions to guarantee Israel’s nuclear monopoly in the Middle East. Also the principles of “self-reliance”, “quality versus quantity”, and the “search for a great-power patron” have proved helpful in order to secure diplomatic support, technology transfers, arms supplies, and economic aid as key strategic components to Israel’s nuclear program. Finally, Israel also applies the principle of “red lines and punishment” in order to prevent any misconception by others regarding Israeli military capacity, its vital interests, and its sensitivity to security threats. These “red lines” have included arms build-up that threatens the military balance with Israel (Suez War 1956); the imposition of a naval blockade (1967 War); the entry of hostile forces into Jordan (1970); and the acquisition by regional states of capabilities to produce nuclear weapons (case of Iraq 1981 and case of Syria 2007).1 Israel is widely considered to be the sixth country in the world to develop nuclear weapons after the United States (1945), the Soviet Union (1949), Great Britain (1952), France (1960), and China (1964). Together with India, Pakistan, and North Korea, Israel now make up the group of states with a nuclear arsenal
not recognized as Nuclear Weapon States by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Unlike the other three, however, Israel has never confirmed its nuclear capability to the world, neither through official statements or a verifiable nuclear weapon test. Instead, Israel maintains a “policy of ambiguity”, known also as “nuclear opacity”, with respect to its nuclear program. Israel has never officially admitted to dispose nuclear weapons and has instead repeated over the years that “it would not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East”. Compared to other countries possessing nuclear weapons, Israel has created its own body of concepts and policies which harmoniously fits its veiled nuclear program. During his visit to Egypt in December 1999, Shimon Peres – commonly regarded as the architect of the Israeli nuclear program and then Minister of Regional Cooperation in the Barak government – was asked whether his assertion that Israel would not be the first country to “introduce” nuclear weapons to the Middle East literarily meant “first to introduce” or “first to use”. Peres’ answer invoked a number of affirmations that Israel had not tested any nuclear weapon and without a test, it could not possibly have “introduced” the weapon either. He went on to confirm that this policy of non-introduction was a commitment that Israel had been giving to the world and to the United States in particular.2 The main focus of this chapter is to assess the nature and evolution of the Israeli nuclear capability as well as its current and long-term implications for regional security in the Middle East. Within this framework the chapter will analyze threat perceptions that led Israel to embark on a nuclear weapon program; its capability and principle building-blocks; the Israeli policy of nuclear ambiguity; the debate on how much the Israeli nuclear program is responsible for nuclear proliferation in the region compared to other factors, such as outside intervention and regional competitions; and, finally, the future vision of having a nuclear-free Middle East. This chapter argues that the Israeli nuclear buildup compared to other countries’ nuclear projects has been shaped by four principle factors: the Israeli obsession of security compared to other countries; the crucial political and technological support from certain Western countries to the secret Israeli nuclear project; the Israeli policy of nuclear ambiguity/opacity; and, finally, the special status that Israel enjoys in the US and European security strategies. This chapter concludes that to address nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, the pursuit of a comprehensive security and cooperation process by countries should be a central component of regional policies endorsed by the major global external actors including the United States, European Union, and NATO.
