ABSTRACT
Before the Japanese delegation headed by a civilian, Mr. Wakatsuki, departed for the London Conference, it received the instructions of the Navy Department outlining the minimum requirements for the security of the country.1 So far the Navy Department and the Cabinet were in agreement. Controversy, however, arose after the deadlock which had occurred in the Conference had been eased by the Reed-Matsudaira Compromise, which reduced the Japanese claims and was accepted by the Cabinet.2 The Cabinet’s acceptance, however, was only made possible by the temporary tenure of the Naval portfolio by Premier Hamaguchi in the absence of the Navy Minister, Admiral Takarabe. Thus although ViceAdmiral Yamanashi, Vice-Minister of the Navy, who attended the Cabinet meeting at which the compromise was accepted, voiced his own and the Navy’s opposition, he was obliged to fall into line, since the acting Navy Minister, Mr. Hamaguchi, voted for the compromise; the Vice-Admiral in fact had no vote and was merely a witness.1 Unprecedented action had been taken, for never before had the Cabinet taken matters of national defence into its own hands; the military authorities had always been consulted. During the Washington Conference Premier Hara had, indeed, acted as Navy Minister, whilst Admiral Kato Tomosaburo was absent, but on that occasion no decision comparable with that of 1930 had had to be taken by the Cabinet.
