ABSTRACT
Frege has presented in SR a good argument that singular terms express a mode of presentation that determines at most one reference. The assumptions of the argument are compatible with different ways in which a sign, a mode of presentation and a reference are related. For example, the argument does not exclude that a sign expresses different modes of presentation, each of which determines a different reference. Frege goes beyond the argument presented when he introduces in SR ‘the regular connection’ (regelmäβige Verknüpfung) between sign, sense and reference:
In a letter to Husserl he uses a diagram to illustrate the regular connections between signs of different kinds and their senses and references:
Sentence Proper name Concept-word ↓ ↓ ↓
Sense of sentence Sense of name Sense of concept-word (Thought) ↓ ↓
↓ ↓ ↓ Truth-value Object Concept→thing
falling under Conc. (PMC: 63; PW: 96-7)
In this diagram, every sign has exactly one sense and signs that differ in shape have different senses. Importantly, Frege adds in SR the following comment:
The regular connection between sign, mode of presentation is not a statistical regularity. ‘Regular’ translates ‘regelmäβig’. The relevant meaning of ‘regular’ is characterised by the presence or operation of a definite rule or set of rules. The regular connection is a connection between sign, mode of presentation and reference that conforms to a rule. Which rule and why is this rule in operation?
