ABSTRACT
In Chapter 4 we discussed Frege’s argument for splitting conceptual content into sense and reference; in Chapter 5 we examined how his distinction between sense and reference plays out for natural language proper names. The argument was only concerned with the sense and reference of proper names. It assumed that assertoric sentences can differ in cognitive value, but it has not committed Frege to a theory of sense and reference for sentences. A large part of SR is therefore devoted to developing a theory of sense and reference for assertoric sentences, that is, sentences in the indicative for which the question can arise whether they say something true or false. All other sentences, optatives, etc., are of no direct interest in SR. In fiction, some assertoric sentences are uttered or inscribed solely with the intention to make as if to say something true or false. Frege calls such sentences pictures (SR, 163, 33 fn). Pictures have only sense, but no reference. If not stated otherwise, ‘sentence’ will refer to assertoric sentences that are intended to have sense and reference.
