ABSTRACT
Introduction The ethical-normative problem is central to the study of social reality. In economics, it assumes a particularly explicit form and clearly shows the underlying methodological confusion. In particular, the distinction between economics and political economy expresses and, so to speak, formalizes a dissociation between positive and normative aspect, being and doing, that causes serious errors and confusion both in the theory and practice. In fact, the pretension to use the teachings of positive economics at the service of normative economy is contradictory since the positivist method excludes, as we know, the normative aspect. The situation is worsened by the dominating influence of the rational choice theory with its instrumental character, that is, the idea that reason cannot indicate where to go but only the way to get efficiently to the established goals. More precisely, according to rational choice theory, beliefs and values come from outside and the task of reason is to choose the more suitable means to achieve the proposed goals. This instrumentalist view has gained a more realistic content in the context of the ‘theory of bounded rationality’, emphasizing the limits of reason. But this benefit in terms of realism has been shortened by various exaggerations and misunderstandings on the characters of bounds, as exemplified, for instance, by the current and mistaken insistence on the unmeasurability of radical uncertainty that strongly reduces the explanatory potentialities of theoretical effort. The formal rigour of the rational choice theory has promoted a deep penetration of its teaching across the scientific community. It is not exaggerated to say that it is at the heart of the difficulties, limitations and contradictions of social thought. In particular, the success of such a theory has much reinforced the postulate of the non-scientific content of values and hence has given a decisive contribution to legitimize the distinction between economics and political economy. All that has suggested to dedicate, in this book, an apposite part to values and rationality. After all, a main characteristic of social reality is the presence of doing alongside being. Such reality cannot escape from moral tension and ignore values; at the same time, it cannot ignore being. As we know, the main and most peculiar methodological problem of social thought concerns the way to combine
those two aspects of human societies, being and doing, instead of sermonizing their inevitable separation. This chapter contains some ideas expressed in Fusari (2009).
