ABSTRACT
It has been said that Mawdudi’s views on revolution are essentially Marxist1
and are tied in with his views on jihad (see below). However, like so much of Mawdudi’s writings, there is considerable ambiguity here. He hardly appears very ‘Marxist’ when, in the 1950s, he opposed the Pakistan Prime Minister Liaqat ’Ali Khan’s land reform in the Punjab, arguing that it is wrong to punish property and that Islam justifies jagirdari. A ‘jagir’, incidentally, was a small territory granted by a ruler or chieftain granted on a short-term basis (about three years) for services rendered. The receiver of this land could then work the land, but the income was taxed and went to the owner. In effect, Mawdudi seemed to be arguing for a form of medieval feudalism!2 Mawdudi was clear that an Islamic state could not occur until the existing political order was removed, and this inevitably would result in some direct action. However, Mawdudi is ambiguous in his writings, but the overall impression is that he was not in support of violent revolution and, instead, saw revolution as a piecemeal thing that is evolutionary in character. Therefore, the word ‘revolution’ might seem a misnomer when referring to Mawdudi’s political agenda, as it would be an orderly transfer of power rather than a spontaneous overthrowing of the existing order. As we have seen, Mawdudi looks back to the prophetic era as his paradigm, with the Prophet extolling such virtues as patience and pacifism. In this respect, Mawdudi’s notion of revolution is more ethical in nature, rather than social or political. That is, people’s moral nature needs to change before society can change. As Nasr notes:
what Mawdudi meant by the term revolution was a process of changing the ethical basis of society, which should begin at the top and permeate into the lower strata. It was a process of cultural engineering based on definite criteria and postulates, which not only would shape society in the image of the din, but would also prepare the ground for an Islamic state. Other social dialectics or aspirations, such as changes in the social structure, were not central to this process and, at any rate, could be accommodated within the framework of the Islamic state.3
