ABSTRACT
Introduction We have seen that the Socratic paradox that virtue is knowledge is logically based on Socrates’ view that virtue brings happiness and vice unhappiness (chapter VI). Without the latter view, the prudential paradox, that no man desires things that are bad for him and that no man pursues such things voluntarily, would have only occasional relevance to virtue and vice. If vice occasionally brings unhappiness, then, given the prudential paradox, we would expect men to avoid vice on these occasions if they have the knowledge or true belief that on these occasions vice will bring them unhappiness. And if virtue occasionally brings happiness, we would similarly expect men to pursue virtue on these occasions if they had the relevant knowledge or true belief. But, if vice on other occasions brings happiness, we would equally expect men to pursue vice on these occasions if they had the relevant knowledge or true belief; and if virtue on occasion brings unhappiness, we would expect that men would avoid virtue on these occasions. Clearly enough, knowledge will not always be sufficient for virtue unless virtue always brings happiness and vice always unhappiness. Not unexpectedly, therefore, we find Socrates making strenuous efforts in the Gorgias to convince Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles that virtue brings happiness and that it is impossible for a wrongdoer to be happy.
