ABSTRACT
In the previous chapters I have tried to develop a picture of Plato’s attempts to counter a rejection of traditional morality, a rejection based on a rival ideal of the man who is above rules and conventions and able to do as he wants. It does not purport to be a complete account of Plato’s treatment of moral questions, but only of a set that clearly seemed to him to be of considerable importance. In connection with his defence of morality he developed a view that somehow virtue was a matter of exercising knowledge. In chapter IV, I offered an account of what that claim amounts to, but that account is open to a number of objections to which I shall now turn as meeting them will make clearer its implications. In the present chapter I shall consider one based on Plato’s approach to mathematics. This will lead to considering other objections from his reaction to Hetacleiteanism and his dictum that knowledge is of what is, that will involve a more extended consideration of his views on episteme and their ramifications.
