ABSTRACT
In the last chapter I considered the view that Plato thought that ‘know’ always does or should take a direct object, and knowing consists in the intellectual perception of that object. I noted that the recollection argument in the Phaedo might suppose this view, especially if it could be supported by other arguments on related topics. The argument that learning is recollecting is itself tied up with some view about the senses’ inadequacy to yield knowledge on certain topics, and about the objects of sense observation not properly exemplifying the properties of Forms. In other words, the argument about recollection seems to form a part of Plato’s polemic against sense-perception and the physical world, in contrast with the unchanging perfect-paradigm world of intellection. It is somehow related to his wish to introduce a special term ‘participate’ to gloss the ‘is’ of ‘X is F’ wherever ‘X’ denotes a particular physical object. This brings in the welter of problems about Plato’s attempt to distinguish between sensible and intellectual objects, the criteria suggested and resultant difficulties with the verb ‘to be’, the theory of Forms and so on. The problem here is to bring the subject-matter into manageable form. After all, the theory of Forms, the term ‘participates’ and the rest were not introduced in face of one single clearly apprehended problem. As is usual with technical ideas in philosophy, they are put to work on what might have seemed similar or related tasks, with resultant strains and uncertainties. Consequently someone looking back on the various uses they are put to is at a loss to discover a single coherent set of views. The matter is worse if one adds in the hypothesis of development on Plato’s part. What follows, therefore, will involve some distortion as I shall try to deal to some extent separately with a number of different strands in Plato’s reactions. To begin with I shall take his reaction to Heracleiteanism. According to Aristotle (Metaphysics A 987a 29 seq.) Plato was attracted to the Heracleitean view that everything is in a state of flux, at least so far as the sensible world is concerned. At the same time, Socrates’ persistent pursuit of definitions led him to postulate Forms as the subject-matter of definitions and of true knowledge. This suggests an obvious picture of his development: for clearly, when Socrates asked ‘what is courage?’ he was not examining individual actions in the field, nor could his questions be settled by pointing to examples. At the same time, he and his answerer seemed to be able to recognise when answers were inadequate which indicated that in some way they already were acquainted with what they hoped to define. So there must be non-sensible objects of study. Further, definitions seem to be timelessly true, and so the objects of them must be unchangingly as they are. So besides the world of constantly changing particulars there is a world of unchanging meanings, or definables, which can be grasped once and for all by the mind. A circle is, eternally, a figure, all points on whose circumference are an equal distance from its centre. But this saucer may change its shape, along with other properties. Thus we can see how the theory of Forms is born of Socrates out of Heracleitus. The Forms are the objects of Socratic definition, and true knowledge is their apprehension. Dialectic sharpens that apprehension, but also that apprehension gov-
erns dialectic. The process of putting up definitions and finding them wanting leads to sharper and more accurate definition, but our knowledge of what is inadequate, what better, shows prior grasp of what is to be defined. The end term is to see clearly the objects to be defined, and by reference to them judge the title of particulars to be described by the term standing for the relevant Form.
