ABSTRACT
In all the coverage of China in the Western media in recent years, much attention has been given to the number of protests that have taken place. This has been evidenced not only in the reports of specific unrest that have broken out in locations such as Weng’an (Guizhou), Fuyu (Shaanxi), Huizhou (Guangdong) and Menglian (Yunnan) in the past year, but also in the conclusions that have been drawn from publication of figures detailing protest activities in China. The first set of figures published by Chinese government officials in the summer of 2005 stated that the number of ‘mass incidents’ (quntixing shijian) increased from 8,700 in 1993 up to 74,000 in 2004, with the number of incidents increasing every single year by a minimum of 9 per cent. A further set of figures was published by the Ministry of Public Security in January 2006 which showed that the number of ‘public order disturbances’ (raoluan gonggong zhixu fanzui) in 2005 had increased by 6.6 per cent from 2004 to 87,000 (EastSouthWestNorth 2006).2 Commenting on these statistics, Sisci notes, ‘one might be tempted to think that Chinese society is falling apart, and indeed, various books and articles have appeared suggesting exactly that’ (2005a). Indeed, Wasserstrom contends that the effect of such reports has been to ‘portray the P.R.C. as a country in danger of coming apart at the seams, ruled by a leadership group whose members are growing increasingly anxious about both the extent of unrest and the domestic media’s coverage of acts of contention’ (2004). Typifying such commentary is that offered by He Qinglian who, in comparing the outbreaks of demonstrations to those of forest fires, suggests that ‘the fire hazards are not simply random areas covered by dry wood … [but] underground fires, smoldering dangerously just below the surface, that could erupt and rage out of control in any place and at any time’ (2003: 71). Indeed, He predicts that ‘[t]he day will come
when the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] will not be able to tamp down these fires’ (2003: 72). Although He’s apocalyptic view is somewhat extreme in its prediction of
the Chinese Communist Party’s future,3 it is part of a more widely held view that the end of its rule is simply inevitable.4 This view first gained widespread consensus following the nationwide demonstrations in 1989. Prior to these demonstrations, China was largely thought to be stable, despite the disagreements amongst the Party’s top leadership concerning the direction of the ‘Reform and Opening Up’ programme.5 However, the demonstrations in 1989 – not only the size and scale of popular support involving different groups from society but also the division and indecision that they produced amongst the top leaders of the CCP – convinced many that the grievances of the protestors would lead to fundamental change. Indeed, Wasserstrom remembers that ‘[e]ighteen years ago, with protesters marching through scores of Chinese cities and giant crowds gathering in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square, many outside observers, myself included, assumed that the era of Communist Party rule in China was nearing its end’ (2007). Moreover, though the leadership’s use of military force to suppress the demonstrations indicated the Party was not prepared to give up its power easily, this served to strengthen such views on the grounds that the CCP had effectively lost any possibility of recovering its legitimacy. Summarizing this change, Goldstein stated back in 1994 that, ‘[a]lthough scholars continue to disagree about the probable life-span of the current regime, now is usually about when, not whether, fundamental political change will occur and what it will look like’ (1994: 727). And though the CCP has remained in power since 1989, this view is still a dominant voice in debates on the Party’s future today. Indeed, commenting on this recently, Schubert claims that ‘[i]t seems to be the established wisdom in the Western academe that Communist one-party rule in present-day China is historically anachronistic and… [r]egime change will therefore happen … and is only a matter of time’ (2008: 191-2). This established wisdom concerning the end of the CCP’s rule points to a
number of problems that exist both within and without the Party. In the case of the Party, it is claimed that the communist ideology has been undermined by the market-oriented reforms put in place since 1978 and, despite recent ideological innovations, such as the ‘Three Represents’ (san ge daibiao), no longer has any legitimating effect with its own cadres or, indeed, the public. In addition, the organizational strength of the Party is said to have declined in the period of ‘Reform and Opening Up’ (gaige kaifang), in large part due to the decentralizing effect of the economic reforms, with the result that the central level of government now exercises less control over the lower levels. As a consequence of this, cadres at the lower levels have been engaged in rentseeking behaviour, such as land requisition and the levying of supplementary fees and taxes, that has both alienated the population and frustrated the leadership of the Party. That said, the steep rise in corruption that has occurred at all levels of government in the reform period is also said to have severely damaged the moral authority of the CCP regime.
