Morocco

Morocco is generally considered to be the least autocratic country in the Arab world and is usually labelled as a semi-democracy or a liberalized autocracy (Brumberg, 2002b). Since independence from France in 1956, the country has displayed both an authoritarian character embodied in the executive preeminence of the monarchy and a democratic one embodied in the presence of a multiparty political system and a degree of societal pluralism. In 1997, Leveau (1997) described the political system of the country as ‘based on authoritarian pluralism’ – an unaccountable authoritarian leader coexisting with a certain degree of pluralism so long as this did not jeopardize his rule. Indeed, since independence the royal family has almost always permitted a degree of political pluralism in the form of competing political parties and civil society organizations. This pluralism was designed to give the impression that Morocco was always moving towards more complete democratic governance. In reality, genuine democratization never materialized, although King Hassan II began a more convincing move towards significant political change (known as l’alternance) in the mid-1990s when he offered the Socialist Party, which until then had seemed marginalized in perpetual opposition, the opportunity to head the government. This offer was eventually accepted in 1997. This change appeared to signal a genuine intention to move the country away from authoritarianism and to prepare the terrain for his son, Mohammed VI, who would succeed him with the objective of further modernizing Morocco. The early days of Mohammed’s VI reign were euphoric ones both for ordinary Moroccans and for political actors who for some time had been calling for the increasing liberalization that the new king was promoting. Despite maintaining a solid grip on policy-making power through his constitutional prerogatives, Mohammed VI did indeed set about liberalizing society. The Moroccan political system has been based on both co-optation and intimidation of dissidents and opponents since the days of independence and it still functioned quite effectively when Hassan II passed away. But its long-term stability was more uncertain because of social changes within the country and outside it (Cohen and Jaidi, 2006). In particular, Morocco witnessed the unexpected growth of Islamism as a political force over the last fifteen years. In the past, the religious legitimacy of the royal family insulated

it from the criticism coming from Islamist movements, which were traditionally small and ‘politically inefficient’ (Munson Jr., 1991). Much of the criticism of the policies of Hassan II came from the Marxist and socialist left, while attempts to overthrow him were carried out by small groups within the military in 1971 and 1972. The religious legitimacy of the king to rule has, however, diminished considerably and is no longer as solid a defence against criticism coming from the forces of political Islam. The immunity from criticism of the Commander of the Faithful has disappeared, as other political actors appropriated the language and symbolism of religion to question the very legitimacy of the king to rule (Mohsen-Finan and Zeghal, 2006). Mohammed VI therefore came to power facing significant expectations and

challenges. On the one hand, the young monarch was expected to continue the liberalization process, open up more space for public debate, improve the economy and move Morocco towards meaningful democratization by progressively reducing the direct role of the monarchy in decision-making. On the other, the challenges confronting Mohammed VI were considerable in so far as Morocco remains a poor country. It has serious social problems ranging from illiteracy to corruption and from absence of social mobility to an enormous gap between rich and poor. In addition, it has a poorly functioning public administration. After ten years at the helm, the record of Mohammed VI is at best mixed in terms of addressing challenges and meeting expectations. While the international situation is partly responsible for the many failures of the monarchy, much of the blame has to rest with a ruler who seems to be unable or unwilling to take decisive steps towards democratization, on the one hand, or the economic reforms that would meet the needs of ordinary Moroccans, on the other. In terms of political reforms, very little has changed under Mohammed VI. Legislative elections still take place with the participation of a number of different political parties with conflicting political programmes, including a legal Islamist movement, the Parti de la Justice et du Développement (the Party of Justice and Development or PJD). The strategy of including Islamist groups in the political and institutional game was a ‘risk’ that Hassan II was willing to take in order to avoid the ‘Algerian scenario’ and Mohammed VI continued his father’s policy towards the PJD (Willis, 2004). What has changed is the degree of fairness of the electoral process. Storm (2008: 359) describes the September 2007 elections as the ‘most competitive, free and fair in the country’s history’. The positive response of the international community and independent monitors also confirms the view that the 2007 elections were indeed a watershed for Morocco in terms of freedom and fairness.1 However, the legislative elections, like the formation of a government that is an expression of the popular vote, do not matter very much in decision-making terms. Without a constitutional reform placing limits on the executive powers of the king, the Moroccan parliament remains very weak, although it has increased its powers somewhat (Denoeux and Desfosses, 2007). Ultimately, the king is responsible for appointing the prime minister and he does not have to pick the leader of the

party topping the poll for this post. As Khalil Jemmah points out, in the Moroccan context ‘government is perceived as a group of employees … who execute policies … which have been decided elsewhere’ (interview with Vice President of the Association Amis et Familles des Victimes de l’Immigration Clandestine). Tuquoi (2006: 205) adds that ‘the government … is nothing but a rubber-stamp institution and a transmission belt between the throne and public administration’. More significantly, the king appoints the most important ministers, including Interior and Foreign Affairs. These and other constitutional prerogatives marginalize elected officials, who therefore function instead as a mode of transmission for decisions that come directly from the Palace or indirectly from the king’s appointed ministers (Amar, 2009). In economic terms, Morocco has experienced tremendous growth over the last decade, pointing to the success of some of the reforms undertaken. There has been significant foreign investment from both Europe and the Gulf States, while the USA and Morocco signed a free trade agreement in 2004 (White, 2005). The problem is that neo-liberal economic development, while producing aggregate figures pointing in the direction of growth, did not lead to a more equitable distribution of wealth or to significant improvement in basic social services (Zemni and Bogaert, 2009). It is true that Mohammed VI made a number of important symbolic gestures during his reign in order to break with the most authoritarian practices of the past, such as the dismissal of the former Minister of Interior Driss Basri, or the launch of human development initiatives destined to improve the life of poor Moroccans, but the nature of the regime itself has not fundamentally changed (Vermeren, 2009). A stalled process of democratization (Cavatorta, 2005) coupled with the persistence of social inequalities do not, however, affect the reputation and standing of Morocco with the international community, which still considers the country as the ‘most democratic’ in the Arab world and the most promising in terms of future democratic and liberal developments. This, in spite of the fact that most scholars would still agree on the fact that the king and the Makhzen, which represents an informal governing alliance between the monarch, his advisers, selected businessmen, high-ranking bureaucrats and tribal chiefs operating as the unelected and unaccountable decision-makers in the country beyond the control of the elected government, still form the basis of decision-making in Morocco.