Yemen

Although Yemen is often seen as one of the oldest centres of civilization in the world, the modern state of Yemen is of quite recent origin and is, in fact, the newest state in the Middle East. The contemporary Republic of Yemen is the result of the merger in 1990 of two precursor states, the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) which occupied the north of what is now the Republic of Yemen, and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), which occupied the south. How the Republic of Yemen came into existence has not only shaped the subsequent (and in terms of the Arab world, atypical) character of political life, but has also determined the context within which Yemeni civil society operates. Because the modern state resulted from the unification of two apparently very different states (conservative and socialist, respectively), a very different political system was established at unification from those found in the rest of the Arabian Gulf or the region, more broadly. In particular, a reasonably competitive party political system came into existence, albeit within limits, as well as space for the activities of civil society actors. The substantial economic, demographic and social problems of the newly united state, combined with economic mismanagement and widespread corruption, left Yemen economically dependent on external aid. This too has contributed to the enlargement of the space available for civil society. The union of the YAR and the PDRY was, on the face of it, unlikely. The

YAR was a conservative, traditionalist state heavily dependent on Western support and aid. The PDRY was a self-styled Marxist state which was reliant on the support of the Soviet Union. However, despite their differences, they shared certain similarities by the end of the Cold War. Both were extremely reliant on a similar list of international creditors, (the World Bank and other multilateral lenders advised both and both owed a substantial debt to the Soviet Union), and at the point of unification, both were not merely financially but also ideologically bankrupt. The YAR, in Carapico’s phrase, ‘came up short on most definitions of a state’ (1998: 52) and was far less able to exert control over its society than was the PDRY. It was viewed as a ‘weak’ state, vast tracts of which were effectively independent of the capital Sana’a. The PDRY, on the other hand, was a highly centralized Marxist dictatorship.

However, events in the late 1980s produced two weak and vulnerable regimes that saw unification as a means to long-term security. As the end of the Cold War approached, both regimes lacked legitimacy, both faced substantial economic problems and the leadership of each saw unification as a process that they could harness in order to bolster their respective positions (Phillips, 2008; Blumi, 2009). Although negotiations were undertaken in an atmosphere of ‘intense dis-

trust’ (Phillips, 2008: 4), agreement on unification was reached between the ruling party of the YAR, the General People’s Congress (GPC), led by, ‘Ali ‘Abdallah Salih and the ruling party of the PDRY, the Yemen Socialist Party (YSP), led by ‘Ali Salim al-Baydh. Blumi suggests that the well-educated socialists of the south believed that unification with the politically unsophisticated north could secure them immunity from challenge in the future. The formal power-sharing agreement gave the YSP key portfolios in future government, such as that of the Prime Minister, Ministry of Defence and Foreign Minister (Carapico, 1998; Blumi, 2009). ‘Ali ‘Abdallah Salih became President of the new republic. Unity was declared on May 22, 1990 and ‘ushered in Yemen’s most liberal, most political civic opening’ (Carapico: 1998 13536). The new Republic of Yemen was declared to be a participatory parliamentary democracy – the first of its kind in the Arabian peninsula (Phillips, 2008). There was an ‘unprecedented’ relaxation of security, political, financial

and legal controls; legal-constitutional guarantees of personal, press and political freedom. The initial power-sharing agreement divided posts in the Presidential Council, the Council of Ministers and Parliament more or less equally between the GPC and the YSP leaving ‘unusual scope’ for third parties to become politically involved (Carapico,1998). A new constitution, which was adopted after a nationwide referendum in 1991, enshrined voting and candidacy rights to all Yemeni citizens, equality before the law, a democratic political system and the independence of the judiciary. A new press law of 1990 guaranteed the right to freedom of expression, the press and access to information, leading to a huge increase in the number of publications in the newly unified state. Political and electoral laws led to the establishment of a range of political parties (some 45 in all, 21 of which contested elections in 1993), while the removal of restrictions on meeting and organizing freely, paved the way for a proliferation of grassroots organizations of all kinds (Phillips, 2008; Carapico, 1998). However, as Phillips has pointed out, the political reforms that were introduced in the early 1990s were motivated more by the need to bring the two parts of the country together rather than ‘any genuine desire to transform Yemen into a genuine democracy’ (2007:5), with the result that reforms were partial and quickly watered down. For example, while the Press Law of 1990 promised freedom of knowledge, expression, the press and access to information, it also set out strict qualifications for journalists and penalties for offences such as humiliating the state or distributing ‘false information’. Anything deemed to be harmful to national unification,

security, the economy, Islam or the president is also technically prohibited from publication (Phillips, 2008:6). Furthermore, most of the apparatus of the two precursor states remained

intact. For example, the process of integrating two army commands was left undone. Trade unions, which formed part of the power base of the YSP, and tribal militias loyal to Salih were left largely untouched. ‘This meant that two different societies still existed with two completely different patronage networks in operation’ (Blumi, 2009: 8) and the very different motivations for entering into union on the part of the leaders of the GPC and YSP made tensions between them inevitable. In the elections of 1993, it was the traditional leadership of the former

YAR in the north that emerged victorious. The General Popular Congress (GPC), under its pre-unification leader, Ali Abdallah Salih, emerged victorious winning 145 seats in the 301-seat parliament. The former ruling party of the PDRY was the big loser, coming third in the elections, behind a newcomer, the Islamist Islah party. The Islah is an amalgamation of predominantly northern tribes, Islamists and other elements. The GPC supported the formation of the party because it viewed the YSP as its main rival after unification. From its establishment in September 1990, Islah was led by Sheikh Abdallah al-Ahmar until his death in December 2007. In a clear illustration of the complexity of political life in Yemen, Al-Ahmar was chief of the most prominent tribal confederation in the country – the Hashid, of which the president’s tribe, Sanhan, is a member. Salih also has personal links with another prominent member of the party, ‘Abd al-Majid al-Zindani. AlZindani has caused controversy, inside and outside the party for his radicalism. He has been accused of fundraising for terrorism and ‘Usama Bin Laden by the United States government. He has also acted as an adviser to President Salih on educational matters and served on the five-person presidential council after the 1993 elections (Browers, 2007: 568). Despite the fact that the party brought together individuals with different agendas and strategies, it took part in the democratization process from its inception. In spite of debate within the party concerning the religious legitimacy of democracy, it has overtly accepted the multiparty system and has never supported armed confrontation with the regime (Bonnefoy, 2009). The elections established the dominance of the GPC, and of the northern

political elite generally, in post-unification political life. Very quickly, southern frustration, and in particular, that of the leadership of the YSP at the winnertake-all character of the new political dispensation, developed into full-scale civil war, which broke out in April 1994 and ended less than two months later with a rout of the southern forces. The victorious GPC, assisted by the Islah party, cracked down on ‘secessionists’ in the YSP and amended the constitution to reverse many of the progressive changes it had introduced – while the language of freedom was retained, new provisions were introduced to make the family the basis of society and to ‘protect’ mothers and children (Phillips, 2008: 7; Carapico, 1998: 58). Hundreds of socialists, dissidents, critics and

liberals left the country. Parliament passed an extensive set of constitutional amendments granting the president unprecedented powers. He was given powers to appoint the vice-president and the prime minister as well as a consultative council previously elected by parliament, to pass laws when parliament is not in session, to dissolve parliament and to declare a state of emergency (Carapico, 1998; Phillips, 2008). A detailed account of the weakness of parliament in post-unification Yemen can be found in Sharif ’s work (2002). Since the end of the 1994 civil war, the GPC has been the dominant actor

in the Yemeni political system and President Salih the dominant figure in the GPC, each having been triumphant in successive parliamentary and presidential elections. In September 1994, new constitutional amendments were adopted without a popular referendum, as a result of which the YSP lost its parliamentary veto and the powers of the president were broadened. The Presidential Council, which in the 1991 constitution was a five member body elected by parliament, was replaced by a Majlis al-Shura whose 59 (now 111) members were appointed by the president. The legal code of the south was nullified. The president was given the power to appoint the prime minister, act as head of the Supreme Judicial Council and decree laws when Parliament was not in session (Phillips, 2008: 7). Although Salih lifted the state of emergency that had been declared in July

1994, there was no restoration of the ‘privileges and tolerances established during the four-year liberal interlude’ (Carapico, 1998: 188). Since the end of the civil war, Yemen has witnessed the emergence of a

hybrid political space which Phillips has characterized a ‘pluralized authoritarianism’ (Phillips, 2008: 3). This is characterized by a political system in which some space is granted to alternative voices, while regular, even competitive, elections are held. However, severe restrictions are placed on the establishment of alternative centres of power that might threaten the elite’. Schwedler argues that the country more closely resembles ‘the autocracy of the pre-unification North than a country in democratic transition’ since the president, despite referring to Yemen as an ‘emerging democracy’ seems uninterested in moving beyond tactical liberalization towards a genuinely open system (Schwedler: 2002, 48). Successive elections since 1994 have demonstrated quite how limited the regime’s commitment to political reform really is. In the national elections of 1997, which followed the end of the civil war, the GPC won 188 seats and Islah won 53, while the YSP boycotted the polls (Schwedler, 2002; Schwedler, 2006: 108). Despite the YSP boycott, the elections were generally seen as relatively free and fair. In 1999, presidential elections were held which Salih ‘won’, having disqualified the YSP candidate, leaving only an alternative candidate from the ruling GPC party, paid by the regime, to oppose him (Schwedler, 2006). In 2001, the GPC-dominated parliament changed the constitution to extend the term in office of the president to seven years.1 Salih became eligible to serve as president until 2013, leading to intense speculation in Yemen that the amendment was part of a strategy

that would see his son, Ahmad, succeed him after a second term in office, along the lines of the succession from father to son that took place in Syria and which many believe is currently being orchestrated in Egypt. In the parliamentary elections of April 2003, the GPC won 225 seats, Islah

46, the YSP 7. There were reported disturbances, instigated by the security forces, in constituencies where opposition candidates were poised to win, as well as rumours that the leaderships of GPC and Islah had negotiated the distribution of twenty disputed seats between them. Nonetheless, the elections were seen as reasonably free and fair. However, Carapico notes: ‘as the GPC chairs all national and local elections commissions, and also manages public airwaves, transport, jobs and services, the deck was stacked in favor of the ruling party’ (Carapico, 2003). Nonetheless, the political system in Yemen is characterized by a degree of

political pluralism as Phillip’s ‘pluralized authoritarianism’ clearly suggests. Although most of the 46 parties that came into existence at unification are either defunct, unrepresentative or ineffective, there are functioning opposition political parties with genuine support bases in the broader population. Indeed, having violently opposed one another during the 1994 civil war, the Islah and the YSP entered into coalition in 2002 together with four smaller parties – the Nasserite Unionists, the Union of Popular Yemeni Forces, Hizb al-Haqq and the Yemeni Ba’ath Party. The coalition, known as the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) is dominated by Islah and the YSP and, as Browers notes, brings together groups committed to secularism with groups committed to the implementation of Islamic law, Zaydi Shi’a with Shafi’I Sunnis, and Islamists with socialists and Arab nationalists (Browers, 2007). Although the ideological coherence of the JMP is close to non-existent, this unusual coalition between socialist and Islamist poltical actors survives. The JMP has been characterized as essentially an undertaking on the part of each of its constituent elements not to compete with other members, either directly or indirectly, if to do so would favour the candidate of a party outside the group (Phillips, 2008: 122). In the 2003 elections, the YSP undertook not to challenge Islah in 130 districts where Islah was deemed to have a better chance of victory and Islah did not challenge the YSP in 30 others. While this did not lead to significant electoral gains for either, the negotiations between the two parties have been described as ‘persistent and intense’ (Phillips, 2008: 124). The 2006 presidential elections saw the six parties of the JMP agree on

a candidate who provided a surprisingly strong challenge to Salih. Faisal Bin Shamlin was a former Minister for Oil who had accrued considerable popularity in Yemen when he resigned his post in 1995 as a protest against corruption levels. In the elections, Bin Shamlin ran on the slogan ‘a president in service of Yemen not Yemen at the service of the president’ (Browers, 2007: 579) and won a creditable 23 per cent of the vote in an election which international observers characterized as free and fair despite irregularities. However, both opposition figures and some international commentators suggest that he may, in fact have won up to 40 per cent of the popular vote

(Day, 2008: 434). Although the elections were seen by many as an indication that genuine electoral competition was still possible in Yemen, the elections were marked by vitriolic assaults on the opposition candidate. Bin Shamlin and his supporters were labelled ‘terrorists’ with links to al-Qaeda, ‘separatists’, and ‘conspirators’ as the president used the fear of violence, fragmentation and extremism as a weapon against his opponents (Longley, 2007: 245; Day, 2008: 426). Nevertheless, and despite the dominance of the president and the ruling

GPC and the partial reversal of the process of political liberalization that took place after the civil war, Yemen is still often considered to be the best hope for significant political reform in the Arabian peninsula. By regional standards, it is still very open politically. The state of emergency has ended, competitive elections take place with a plurality of opposition parties. The presence of a credible alternative candidate in the 2006 presidential elections would not have been tolerated in many other Arab states. Yemen still has a constitution which establishes basic rights and freedoms, and despite significant limitations, a vibrant associational life. Indeed, the Country Strategy Paper of the European Union asserts that, despite the denial of a wide range of social, economic and political rights to large segments of society and the prevalence of torture and ill-treatment: ‘by regional standards, democracy is reasonably well-developed in Yemen’ (European Commission, 2007: 12).