ABSTRACT
The discussion of cosmopolitanism in global finance can be theoretically located and addressed via an engagement with what might be termed the ‘ethical turn in IPE’. The Introduction identified the central concern of this book: to analyse critically the possibilities and limits of cosmopolitan ethics in global finance via a case study of the Tobin tax. This chapter will now develop the theoretical framework of the book by addressing the recent and growing interest in the subject (and power) of ethics in IPE, in general, and Richard Rorty’s (1979, 1989) philosophical pragmatism, in particular. It presents a critique of the way in which different approaches to IPE have considered the question of ethics, before suggesting how Rorty can contribute. After outlining the main themes of Rorty’s work and addressing some of
the central criticisms of it, the chapter points to the praxeological elements of his Oakeshottian view of philosophy as a voice in the ‘conversation of mankind’ (1979: 264), as a means to operationalise cosmopolitan ethics in global finance. Briefly, by treating articulations of global justice and democracy as contributions to a conversation about global ethics – articulations that have a clear resonance in the Tobin tax campaign – we can productively converse by critiquing and extending such contributions. The chapter is in four sections. The first section looks at the recent and
growing demand for ethics in IPE and addresses two key limitations with current framings. Taking a lead from critical and post-structural thought, the question of ethics is re-phrased as one which is not about introducing some ‘pre-discursive realm of goodness’ to the ‘regrettably power-laden world’ that IPE observes, but rather as seeking to understand the way ethics and ethical arguments are intimately bound up with power relations in the first place. From this point of view, theoretical separations between positive and normative, ethics and politics, and, indeed, ethics and power are unsustainable. Ethics is a constitutive power similar to any other discourse. However, an impasse is identified between neo-Gramscians, who celebrate the emancipatory potential of constitutive theory, and post-structuralists, who find the recognition of contingency potentially debilitating. Rather than choosing between each position, I argue that we should instead explore the philosophical pragmatism of Richard Rorty.
