ABSTRACT
When a new Léopoldville government was formed under Adoula on 11 July its moderate character was naturally welcomed by the American embassy. The fact that seven out of the 27 members were members of the Parti National du Progrès (PNP), formed in November 1959 from moderates supporting independence within the framework proposed by de Schrijver, was a significant change. The PNP had become known as ‘the party of the Belgians’ as a result, and in addition all but one of the six MNC-Lumumba members were regarded as being from the moderate wing. The irony of this in a Cold War context is only emphasised by the fact that the new government now excluded the extremist ‘nationalists’ Gbenye, Gizenga, Kama and Bisukiro, whom the Americans had been keen to portray as communist sympathisers eager to bring in the Soviets, and who were now seen more as allies of Tshombe in the battle to destroy the Adoula government.1 The problem was the more suitable and malleable the government was for Western interests, the less likely it was to be effective in justifying the continued Katangan secession. A crisis was unfolding when more than ever before the Americans had the right type of African tools to carry out their Cold War job. The tools however were unsuitable precisely because Katangan secession had still not been ended. The Europeans saw significant difficulties in applying the kind of pressures – military or economic – that would force Tshombe to end secession. Many Europeans in Africa were reluctant to withdraw their support from Tshombe’s regime while in the European capitals others, including some governments, were reluctant to help end it. The US in early July was now even more on the horns of the Cold War decolonisation dilemma of how to encourage Africans while being supportive of Europeans. US representatives at the UN had a choice between the devil and the deep blue sea. For the British in particular, the aversion to a ‘third round’ of fighting meant economic measures enforced by the UN in Katanga had to be avoided as even Bunche believed this would produce a ‘third round’. That meant the only option was to continue with a mix of threats and assurances to ‘persuade’ Tshombe. Unfortunately, all now believed these would not work and could result in the fall of the moderate Adoula government. On the other hand, a display of economic sanctions and military measures could mean a highly
disagreeable Security Council meeting which would expose the divisions in the Western alliance.2 The Americans were prepared to consider solutions outside the UN especially as Gardiner was reluctant to impose a time frame for any operations. Economic measures implemented outside Katanga were also possible but the Americans believed they were unlikely to be effective.3 The Americans also had increasingly to face the fact that it was unlikely UMHK was going to end its cooperation with Tshombe and the British would not agree to jeopardise their economic interests in southern Africa. Adoula’s more moderate government was unlikely to generate significantly more political support when Tshombe remained defiant. Its foreign currency reserves had now run out and its foreign exchange receipts were only sufficient to cover about one-third of its requirements. This made Tshombe’s propaganda that the Léopoldville government was not economically viable, in contrast to the brilliant prospects of Katanga, more effective. Worse, the chaos in the central government’s finances, exacerbated by the economic drain of the ANC and its soldiers’ pay, had rendered foreign aid ineffective in stabilising the general economic situation and curing inflation.4
