ABSTRACT
The decision of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in the case of Prosecutor v Akayesu (ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment 2 September 1998) has been heralded by many as signalling a new, and improved, approach to defining the offence of rape (at least, although not necessarily solely, for the purposes of international criminal law). The background to the Akayesu judgment is discussed in detail in subsequent chapters (see, in particular, the discussion by Cole and Buss in this collection). For current purposes suffice it to say that, in its judgment, the ICTR sought to ensure that the fundamentally aggressive nature of the act of rape should not be eclipsed by a mechanical obsession with what needs to be done (e.g. penetration) with which body parts. Thus, a ‘conceptual’ rather than ‘cataloguing’ approach was adopted, emphasizing that rape represents a violation of personal dignity, which can be used to intimidate, degrade, humiliate, discriminate, punish, control or destroy a person. Rape was defined as a ‘physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed under circumstances which are coercive’ (paras 597-8), although it was noted that, for it to constitute a crime against humanity, the rape(s) must have been committed as part of a systematic/widespread attack on a civilian population and grounded in national, ethnic, political, racial or religious discrimination.
