ABSTRACT

Action theorists and formal epistemologists often pursue parallel inquiries regarding rationality, with the former focused on practical rationality, and the latter focused on theoretical rationality. In both fields, there is currently a strong interest in exploring rationality in relation to time. This exploration raises questions about the rationality of certain patterns over time. For example, it raises questions about the rational permissibility of certain patterns of intention; similarly, it raises questions about the rational permissibility of certain patterns of belief. While the action-theoretic and epistemic questions raised are closely related, advances in one field are not always processed by the other.

This volume brings together contributions by scholars in action theory and formal epistemology working on questions regarding rationality and time so that researchers in these overlapping fields can profit from each other’s insights. This book was originally published as a special issue of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy.

chapter |1 pages

Foreword

chapter 3|1 pages

A complication

chapter 4|6 pages

The real puzzle of the self-torturer

chapter |2 pages

Notes

chapter |2 pages

Acknowledgments

chapter 2|2 pages

Stage setting

chapter 5|4 pages

Avoiding cases involving infinity

chapter 7|8 pages

Conclusion

chapter |1 pages

References

chapter |4 pages

Wittgensteinian arithmetic

chapter |3 pages

Examples, time, and causality

chapter |2 pages

Notes

chapter |1 pages

Acknowledgements

chapter |2 pages

References

chapter 2|2 pages

Synchronic requirements

chapter 3|1 pages

Rationality and reasoning

chapter 4|1 pages

Correctness of reasoning

chapter 5|2 pages

Rules of reasoning

chapter 6|3 pages

Basing prohibitions

chapter 7|2 pages

Basing permissions

chapter 10|1 pages

Are there synchronic requirements?

chapter |1 pages

Notes

part 5|2 pages

The courage of conviction

chapter 1|4 pages

Transparency

chapter 2|4 pages

Epistemic temptation

chapter 3|3 pages

The diachronic first-person perspective

chapter 4|4 pages

Rationality and alienation

chapter 5|2 pages

Belief and volition

chapter |2 pages

Notes

chapter |2 pages

Acknowledgements

part 6|1 pages

Continuing on

chapter 1|5 pages

Available approaches

chapter 2|5 pages

Desiderata

chapter 3|5 pages

A positive account

chapter |4 pages

Notes

chapter |2 pages

References

chapter 7|24 pages

Memory, belief and time

chapter 3|7 pages

Naturalness

chapter 4|6 pages

Explanationism

chapter 5|5 pages

Conclusion

chapter |2 pages

References

part 9|1 pages

Don’t stop believing

chapter 1|4 pages

The conflict

chapter 2|8 pages

Problems for time-slice rationality

chapter 3|6 pages

Rational information loss

chapter 4|2 pages

Conclusion

chapter |2 pages

Disclosure statement

chapter 2|2 pages

Background

chapter 3|5 pages

The time of evidence question

chapter 5|1 pages

Interlude: deontic logic

chapter 6|5 pages

The narrow vs. wide scope question

chapter 7|1 pages

Precise formulations

chapter |6 pages

Notes

chapter |2 pages

References

chapter |1 pages

Appendix A

chapter |2 pages

Appendix B

chapter |1 pages

Appendix C

chapter 4|4 pages

Redescribing the outcomes

chapter 5|3 pages

What’s wrong with redescription?

chapter 6|1 pages

Conclusion

chapter |1 pages

Notes

chapter |3 pages

Appendix 1

part 12|1 pages

Costs of abandoning the Sure-Thing Principle

chapter 1|1 pages

The Sure-Thing principle

chapter 4|3 pages

A lesson about simplifying lotteries

chapter 5|1 pages

Conclusion

chapter |1 pages

Notes

chapter 3|3 pages

Pettigrew’s second challenge: estimates

chapter 6|1 pages

Conclusion