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Action and Ethics in Aristotle and Hegel
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Action and Ethics in Aristotle and Hegel

Escaping the Malign Influence of Kant

Action and Ethics in Aristotle and Hegel

Escaping the Malign Influence of Kant

ByGary Pendlebury
Edition 1st Edition
First Published 2005
eBook Published 5 July 2017
Pub. location London
Imprint Routledge
DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4324/9781315263410
Pages 222 pages
eBook ISBN 9781351960984
SubjectsHumanities
KeywordsEthical Life, Practical Syllogism, Hegel's Discussion, Purposive Action, Political Creatures
Get Citation

Get Citation

Pendlebury, G. (2006). Action and Ethics in Aristotle and Hegel. London: Routledge, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315263410
ABOUT THIS BOOK

Pendlebury alleges that abstraction and rationalization have had a strong and malign influence on normative moral philosophy in the 20th century. Criticizing writers such as Hare, Rawls and Scanlon for pursuing a conception of moral philosophy that bears little resemblance to the way in which human beings actually think and conduct themselves, Pendlebury, instead, suggests a ’Virtue Ethics’ inspired by Hegel’s and Aristotle’s accounts of action as a corrective to this trend, showing that moral activity is historically and socially based and must address the formed character of individual agents. This trend, which began with the responses by Locke, Hume and Kant to Descartes’ Meditations, rendered moral philosophy individualistic and psychologistic in contrast to Aristotle and Hegel’s claim that man is essentially a social creature. Pendlebury argues that this should be the starting point of any account and understanding of morality which roots the concept of will in the practical activity involved in being a member of an ethical community rather than an abstract metaphysical entity that is supposedly in the possession of individuals. In providing a critique of modern moral philosophy from this perspective, Pendlebury’s line of enquiry lends much support to ’Virtue Ethics’ as exemplified in the work of Hursthouse and Slote, while taking a more combative approach with those with whom he disputes. In doing so he shows that serious considerations of continental philosophy highlights the richness of moral activity absent from ’analytical’ tradition which for so long has been bent on marginalizing it.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
chapter |22 pages
Introduction
View abstract
part 1|75 pages
Hegel on Philosophy, Ethics and Will
chapter 1|25 pages
Modern Philosophy and Ethics
View abstract
chapter 2|26 pages
Ethics and the Individual: Law, Reason and Freedom
View abstract
chapter 3|21 pages
Will, Ethics and Action
View abstract
part 2|101 pages
Aristotle and Hegel on the Conditions of Action
chapter 4|22 pages
Reason and Desire in Character and Action
View abstract
chapter 5|25 pages
Judgement, Conscience and Weakness of Will
View abstract
chapter 6|26 pages
Agency, Choice and Self-Sufficiency
View abstract
chapter 7|19 pages
Eudaimonia and Action
View abstract
chapter |5 pages
Conclusion
View abstract

Pendlebury alleges that abstraction and rationalization have had a strong and malign influence on normative moral philosophy in the 20th century. Criticizing writers such as Hare, Rawls and Scanlon for pursuing a conception of moral philosophy that bears little resemblance to the way in which human beings actually think and conduct themselves, Pendlebury, instead, suggests a ’Virtue Ethics’ inspired by Hegel’s and Aristotle’s accounts of action as a corrective to this trend, showing that moral activity is historically and socially based and must address the formed character of individual agents. This trend, which began with the responses by Locke, Hume and Kant to Descartes’ Meditations, rendered moral philosophy individualistic and psychologistic in contrast to Aristotle and Hegel’s claim that man is essentially a social creature. Pendlebury argues that this should be the starting point of any account and understanding of morality which roots the concept of will in the practical activity involved in being a member of an ethical community rather than an abstract metaphysical entity that is supposedly in the possession of individuals. In providing a critique of modern moral philosophy from this perspective, Pendlebury’s line of enquiry lends much support to ’Virtue Ethics’ as exemplified in the work of Hursthouse and Slote, while taking a more combative approach with those with whom he disputes. In doing so he shows that serious considerations of continental philosophy highlights the richness of moral activity absent from ’analytical’ tradition which for so long has been bent on marginalizing it.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
chapter |22 pages
Introduction
View abstract
part 1|75 pages
Hegel on Philosophy, Ethics and Will
chapter 1|25 pages
Modern Philosophy and Ethics
View abstract
chapter 2|26 pages
Ethics and the Individual: Law, Reason and Freedom
View abstract
chapter 3|21 pages
Will, Ethics and Action
View abstract
part 2|101 pages
Aristotle and Hegel on the Conditions of Action
chapter 4|22 pages
Reason and Desire in Character and Action
View abstract
chapter 5|25 pages
Judgement, Conscience and Weakness of Will
View abstract
chapter 6|26 pages
Agency, Choice and Self-Sufficiency
View abstract
chapter 7|19 pages
Eudaimonia and Action
View abstract
chapter |5 pages
Conclusion
View abstract
CONTENTS
ABOUT THIS BOOK

Pendlebury alleges that abstraction and rationalization have had a strong and malign influence on normative moral philosophy in the 20th century. Criticizing writers such as Hare, Rawls and Scanlon for pursuing a conception of moral philosophy that bears little resemblance to the way in which human beings actually think and conduct themselves, Pendlebury, instead, suggests a ’Virtue Ethics’ inspired by Hegel’s and Aristotle’s accounts of action as a corrective to this trend, showing that moral activity is historically and socially based and must address the formed character of individual agents. This trend, which began with the responses by Locke, Hume and Kant to Descartes’ Meditations, rendered moral philosophy individualistic and psychologistic in contrast to Aristotle and Hegel’s claim that man is essentially a social creature. Pendlebury argues that this should be the starting point of any account and understanding of morality which roots the concept of will in the practical activity involved in being a member of an ethical community rather than an abstract metaphysical entity that is supposedly in the possession of individuals. In providing a critique of modern moral philosophy from this perspective, Pendlebury’s line of enquiry lends much support to ’Virtue Ethics’ as exemplified in the work of Hursthouse and Slote, while taking a more combative approach with those with whom he disputes. In doing so he shows that serious considerations of continental philosophy highlights the richness of moral activity absent from ’analytical’ tradition which for so long has been bent on marginalizing it.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
chapter |22 pages
Introduction
View abstract
part 1|75 pages
Hegel on Philosophy, Ethics and Will
chapter 1|25 pages
Modern Philosophy and Ethics
View abstract
chapter 2|26 pages
Ethics and the Individual: Law, Reason and Freedom
View abstract
chapter 3|21 pages
Will, Ethics and Action
View abstract
part 2|101 pages
Aristotle and Hegel on the Conditions of Action
chapter 4|22 pages
Reason and Desire in Character and Action
View abstract
chapter 5|25 pages
Judgement, Conscience and Weakness of Will
View abstract
chapter 6|26 pages
Agency, Choice and Self-Sufficiency
View abstract
chapter 7|19 pages
Eudaimonia and Action
View abstract
chapter |5 pages
Conclusion
View abstract

Pendlebury alleges that abstraction and rationalization have had a strong and malign influence on normative moral philosophy in the 20th century. Criticizing writers such as Hare, Rawls and Scanlon for pursuing a conception of moral philosophy that bears little resemblance to the way in which human beings actually think and conduct themselves, Pendlebury, instead, suggests a ’Virtue Ethics’ inspired by Hegel’s and Aristotle’s accounts of action as a corrective to this trend, showing that moral activity is historically and socially based and must address the formed character of individual agents. This trend, which began with the responses by Locke, Hume and Kant to Descartes’ Meditations, rendered moral philosophy individualistic and psychologistic in contrast to Aristotle and Hegel’s claim that man is essentially a social creature. Pendlebury argues that this should be the starting point of any account and understanding of morality which roots the concept of will in the practical activity involved in being a member of an ethical community rather than an abstract metaphysical entity that is supposedly in the possession of individuals. In providing a critique of modern moral philosophy from this perspective, Pendlebury’s line of enquiry lends much support to ’Virtue Ethics’ as exemplified in the work of Hursthouse and Slote, while taking a more combative approach with those with whom he disputes. In doing so he shows that serious considerations of continental philosophy highlights the richness of moral activity absent from ’analytical’ tradition which for so long has been bent on marginalizing it.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
chapter |22 pages
Introduction
View abstract
part 1|75 pages
Hegel on Philosophy, Ethics and Will
chapter 1|25 pages
Modern Philosophy and Ethics
View abstract
chapter 2|26 pages
Ethics and the Individual: Law, Reason and Freedom
View abstract
chapter 3|21 pages
Will, Ethics and Action
View abstract
part 2|101 pages
Aristotle and Hegel on the Conditions of Action
chapter 4|22 pages
Reason and Desire in Character and Action
View abstract
chapter 5|25 pages
Judgement, Conscience and Weakness of Will
View abstract
chapter 6|26 pages
Agency, Choice and Self-Sufficiency
View abstract
chapter 7|19 pages
Eudaimonia and Action
View abstract
chapter |5 pages
Conclusion
View abstract
ABOUT THIS BOOK
ABOUT THIS BOOK

Pendlebury alleges that abstraction and rationalization have had a strong and malign influence on normative moral philosophy in the 20th century. Criticizing writers such as Hare, Rawls and Scanlon for pursuing a conception of moral philosophy that bears little resemblance to the way in which human beings actually think and conduct themselves, Pendlebury, instead, suggests a ’Virtue Ethics’ inspired by Hegel’s and Aristotle’s accounts of action as a corrective to this trend, showing that moral activity is historically and socially based and must address the formed character of individual agents. This trend, which began with the responses by Locke, Hume and Kant to Descartes’ Meditations, rendered moral philosophy individualistic and psychologistic in contrast to Aristotle and Hegel’s claim that man is essentially a social creature. Pendlebury argues that this should be the starting point of any account and understanding of morality which roots the concept of will in the practical activity involved in being a member of an ethical community rather than an abstract metaphysical entity that is supposedly in the possession of individuals. In providing a critique of modern moral philosophy from this perspective, Pendlebury’s line of enquiry lends much support to ’Virtue Ethics’ as exemplified in the work of Hursthouse and Slote, while taking a more combative approach with those with whom he disputes. In doing so he shows that serious considerations of continental philosophy highlights the richness of moral activity absent from ’analytical’ tradition which for so long has been bent on marginalizing it.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
chapter |22 pages
Introduction
View abstract
part 1|75 pages
Hegel on Philosophy, Ethics and Will
chapter 1|25 pages
Modern Philosophy and Ethics
View abstract
chapter 2|26 pages
Ethics and the Individual: Law, Reason and Freedom
View abstract
chapter 3|21 pages
Will, Ethics and Action
View abstract
part 2|101 pages
Aristotle and Hegel on the Conditions of Action
chapter 4|22 pages
Reason and Desire in Character and Action
View abstract
chapter 5|25 pages
Judgement, Conscience and Weakness of Will
View abstract
chapter 6|26 pages
Agency, Choice and Self-Sufficiency
View abstract
chapter 7|19 pages
Eudaimonia and Action
View abstract
chapter |5 pages
Conclusion
View abstract

Pendlebury alleges that abstraction and rationalization have had a strong and malign influence on normative moral philosophy in the 20th century. Criticizing writers such as Hare, Rawls and Scanlon for pursuing a conception of moral philosophy that bears little resemblance to the way in which human beings actually think and conduct themselves, Pendlebury, instead, suggests a ’Virtue Ethics’ inspired by Hegel’s and Aristotle’s accounts of action as a corrective to this trend, showing that moral activity is historically and socially based and must address the formed character of individual agents. This trend, which began with the responses by Locke, Hume and Kant to Descartes’ Meditations, rendered moral philosophy individualistic and psychologistic in contrast to Aristotle and Hegel’s claim that man is essentially a social creature. Pendlebury argues that this should be the starting point of any account and understanding of morality which roots the concept of will in the practical activity involved in being a member of an ethical community rather than an abstract metaphysical entity that is supposedly in the possession of individuals. In providing a critique of modern moral philosophy from this perspective, Pendlebury’s line of enquiry lends much support to ’Virtue Ethics’ as exemplified in the work of Hursthouse and Slote, while taking a more combative approach with those with whom he disputes. In doing so he shows that serious considerations of continental philosophy highlights the richness of moral activity absent from ’analytical’ tradition which for so long has been bent on marginalizing it.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
chapter |22 pages
Introduction
View abstract
part 1|75 pages
Hegel on Philosophy, Ethics and Will
chapter 1|25 pages
Modern Philosophy and Ethics
View abstract
chapter 2|26 pages
Ethics and the Individual: Law, Reason and Freedom
View abstract
chapter 3|21 pages
Will, Ethics and Action
View abstract
part 2|101 pages
Aristotle and Hegel on the Conditions of Action
chapter 4|22 pages
Reason and Desire in Character and Action
View abstract
chapter 5|25 pages
Judgement, Conscience and Weakness of Will
View abstract
chapter 6|26 pages
Agency, Choice and Self-Sufficiency
View abstract
chapter 7|19 pages
Eudaimonia and Action
View abstract
chapter |5 pages
Conclusion
View abstract
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