ABSTRACT
Kant addresses and criticizes the cognitive reductionism of subject-centred reason. In the process of grappling with the imagination's indispensable work in a second encounter with it, in the Critique of Judgement Kant implicitly problematizes reason and its transcendental grounding. It addresses the problem of unsociable sociability in the context of the 'sublime' gaps that Kant constructs between reason and imagination. Kant shifts the problem of knowledge from a preoccupation with empirical conditions to that of a human capacity which not only makes this interaction with empirical conditions possible, but also establishes its own conditions and criteria. Epistemology shifts from a static theory of empirically derived knowledge-formation to a dynamic theory of reason in action, that is, as critical reflection, which does not concern itself with objects, but with the conditions under which concepts can be formed. In the context of the Critique of Judgement the imaginary component of the mathematical or schematic synthesis is loosened from its cognitive dimension.
