ABSTRACT

In The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity Habermas argues that the rationalization processes of modernity are essentially ambiguous: rationalization involves both a real increment in rationality and a distortion of reason. The real increment in rationality can only be comprehended from the perspective of communicative rationality; while the distortions of rationality are best comprehended as illegitimate extensions of subject-centred reason into an inter-subjectively constituted lifeworld. The force of performative self-contradiction in Habermas depends upon its structure exemplifying the logical movement of the causality of fate. Habermas's allegiance to Hegel's conceptions of ethical life and the causality of fate is more extensive than his use of performative self-contradiction might indicate. Philosophical modernism cannot be said to be unaware of the communicative rationality that Habermas contends provide the sole basis for enlightening reason about itself. Aesthetic reflective judgments, where the suitability of an object for subsumption is interrogated, are thus best regarded as species of reflective judgment in general.