ABSTRACT
For whatever reason, present-day theories which distinguish between the person and the human being are not in general metaphysically dualist, but simply argue that the counting of persons proceeds on a different principle from the counting of human beings. The argument employs two main kinds of example: cases of multiple personality, in which people seem to outnumber biological individuals; and cases of personal survival of biological death. As an example of the first kind, we can imagine a race of two-headed giants: each head of each giant (like Locke's day-man and night-man) has its own discrete consciousness, referring to itself as 'I' and to its fellow in the second or third person. A trite example of the second kind is the easily imagined braintransplant such that, of the two human beings involved, it is the braindonor, rather than the brain-recipient, who will look forward to a successful operation as a kind of survival. On the other hand, if the recipient has already suffered 'brain-death', then it may be said that that person has ceased to exist, although the human animal remains biologically alive.
