ABSTRACT
If the reader decides to admit, I, simple aesthetic properties, 1 such as beauty, loveliness, grandeur, and prettiness, and supposes that things have these properties as they have redness or temperature, he has the dictionary on his side, but gets no further enlightenment as to the nature of his experiences. Such an aesthetic, though capable of much elegant internal development, as, for example, the postulation of a special Sense of Beauty, has no connections with any other aspects of the Universe. Beauty becomes an ultimate unanalysable idea, and no criticism or discussion is possible. Such a view gains support from the existence of many works whose artistic value it has been difficult to explain by current theories (Plate C), or which have not generally been regarded as works of Art – e.g., aeroplanes, etc. If, on the other hand, he does not allow such properties and considers that what he is preferring is, II, some arrangement of physical features, he is committed to the view that one arrangement of physical features can be in itself preferable to (more valuable than) another. It is at least doubtful whether there is any sense in speaking of a preference for (the value of) things other than mental states or experiences. When people say they prefer coffee to tea, they will, if questioned, generally admit that it is either one flavour which they prefer to another, or one set of mental effects; and if they tasted neither, nor had effects from either, the two potations would be indifferent. Our inquirer will, on these grounds, take a psychological view, unless he is attracted by one of the doctrines comprised under group B.
