chapter  6
5 Pages

Value as an Ultimate Idea

The persuasiveness of this refutation is found to vary enor-{31} mously from individual to individual, for the results of the experiments upon which it relies differ. Those who have accus­ tomed themselves to the belief that good is a supersensuous simple Idea readily discover the fraudulent character of any offered substitute, while those who hold some psychological [42] theory of value, with equal ease identify their account with ‘good’. The further question, ‘When and under what conditions can judgements be distinguished?’ arises, a question so difficult to answer that any argument becomes suspect which depends upon assuming that they can be infallibly recognized as differ­ ent. If for any reason we wish to distinguish two judgements, we can persuade ourselves, in any case in which they are differently formulated, that they are different. Thus it has been thought that ‘a exceeds b’ and ‘a is greater than V are distinguishable, the first being supposed to state simply that a has the relation ‘exceeds’ to b, while the second is supposed to state that a has the relation ‘is’ to greater which again has the relation ‘than’ to b . 1 The conclusion to be drawn from the application of such meth­ ods to the problem of the meaning of Good would seem to be that they are not competent to decide anything about it - by no means a valueless result.