PROMOTER'S ENTERPRISE AND PROMOTER'S PROFITS
With the exception of the remarks in the last paragraphs regarding combines of enterprises, this exposition has presupposed the owner's enterprise. When it comes to the collective enterprise, conditions are in many respects different. The wages of management are apportioned among officials; in the case of the mixed forms of the stock-company and combine these wages are very large for the highest managers. They are lower in the pure form of officials' enterprise, because the most forceful leaders naturally prefer to connect themselves with the former class. Nothing inures to the legal owners in these cases except entrepreneur's interest and profit. The prospects of profit are, however, materially diminished. In the case of stock-companies and combines this is because of the intervention of the promoters which we shall presently discuss in more detail. In the case of the officials' enterprise the main factor is that, as the most recent form of enterprise, it made its appearance only in a period of waning entrepreneur's profits and must cling to the narrower and safer ground of approved technical and commercial experience, which is taken for granted under the management of officials. When such concerns take over existing owner's enterprises or stock-companies, they are charged from the start with interest on the purchase price, in which the full specific entrepreneur's profit of the preceding owner has been capitalized. Especially the state and city, because of their governmental trusteeship, are bound to exercise greater leniency as employers; they are also more inclined to yield to expressions of public opinion. In general they are likely to be less vigorous in defending the interests of the entrepreneur.