ABSTRACT
In both countries the early insurgent situations were ominous; they bore striking resemblance to insurgencies which had succeeded or were to succeed. Revolt against colonial rule in Malaya could be likened to the Vietminh struggle for independence; peasant revolt against the corrupt and incompetent government of the Philippines could be likened to the Communist struggle against the Nationalists in China-or to the Vietcong struggle against the Saigon regime. Yet the differences proved to be even more important-and a large factor in these differences (in the Philippines, thanks to a change in leadership, the decisive factor) was the 'enlightened' nature of the government under attack: that is, it assessed the situation realistically and worked out effective remedies for existing weaknesses. This is in contrast to the obstinate pursuit of selfish interests by Chiang Kaishek and the dominant reactionary wing of the Kuomintang in China; by the French settlers, officials and some soldiers in IndoChina; and by Diem and his successors in Vietnam. For the insurgent situation involves the people, most of whom are peasants. The struggle is a competition for their loyalty (the active support of a minority, the acquiescence of the majority); but if one side realizes this and the other does not, the latter is half way to losing the battle.
