ABSTRACT

T he fact that peace had been concluded with Persia and, further, that the Persian army was too demoralised to inspire alarm of itself, even in the event of the treaty of Turkmentchai not being ratified,1 relieved to some ex­ tent Russia’s anxiety on the outbreak of the Turkish war ; yet the situation was a serious one.2 Turkish generalship might, and did, as it turned out, compare unfavourably with that of Abbas Mirza; but on the other hand the Turkish soldiery were superior to the Persian, and more numerous ; 3 the Russian army was for the most part still engaged in mountainous Armenia, and could not possibly be con­ centrated without considerable delay at the strategic points indicated by the new state of affairs ; and meantime the whole frontier, stretching from Mount Ararat to the Black Sea and up the coast to Soukhoum-Kalé, lay open to hostile attack. For there was no field force immediately available, and the Russian garrisons were weak and widely scattered. Moreover, war with Turkey involved the nor­ thern Caucasus as well : in the west directly, for the Turks held the Black Sea coast; in the east indirectly, owing

1 It was ratified on the 29th July 1828 under the walls of Akhalkalâki. 3 See Paskiévitch^ secret despatch to Nesselrode on the coming campaign,

to Turkish influence over the Sunnite population of Tchetchnia and Daghestan. Fortunately for the Russians, Oriental inertness and inefficiency once more stood them in good stead. “ It allowed them to remount the cavalry and recruit the transport service, and more than 14,000 horses and bullocks were received from the line of the Caucasus before a single Turkish soldier had taken the field. Vast quantities of provisions were found in the magazines of the Persian Government. . . .” 1

The task set the army of the Caucasus by the Emperor, whose confidence in Paskiévitch and the forces entrusted to him never wavered, was twofold : to divert pressure from the Danube, the seat of war in Europe, and to obtain possession of such places as would round off and make safe the Russian frontier in the Caucasus and in Asia Minor. For this purpose it was deemed sufficient to make conquest of the pashaliks of Kars and Akhaltsikh, and the maritime fortresses of Poti and Anâpa. To begin with, however, the danger threatening not merely the outlying forts, but Goumri, Mingrelia, Imeritia, and even Georgia proper, must be met, and to this Paskiévitch now directed his whole energies.