ABSTRACT
Soviet plans for the employment of forward groups of forces after the mid-1950s also encompassed non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces, which became a key ingredient in the ensuing concept of the theater-strategic offensive. The Khalkhin Gol and Korean-based paradigms, which Soviet theorists emphasized after the flaws of the Kursk paradigm became apparent, better matches articulated Soviet intent. The 1920s paradigm best represents future geopolitical, strategic, economic, and military relationships within a post-Conventional Forces Europe Agreement Europe and addresses the key issue of Soviet attitudes toward Eastern European successor states and to new European threats. In the period before 22 June 1941, a strong and hostile Germany in the west and Japan in the east had borders contiguous to the Soviet Union. The model of June 1941, which is advanced primarily by those who support the Kursk paradigm, poses three problems for the Soviets.
