ABSTRACT
Soviet experimentation with airborne and air assault operations has spanned half a century. That the Soviets would consider adopting such a revolutionary military concept was understandable. Airborne operations were a natural outgrowth of a greater attempt to free battle from the fetters of positional warfare. Those who developed the concept of deep battle to restore the primacy of the offensive to the battlefield viewed airborne operations as yet another dimension of mobile, fluid war. Vertical envelopment by airborne forces emerged as an adjunct to high-speed mechanized operations intended to strike deeply into enemy rear areas. Tanks, mechanized infantry, and airborne forces became the means of effecting deep battle. Under the guidance of Marshal Tukhachevsky, the twin theories of deep battle and deep operations matured; and a force structure evolved to translate those theories into practice. But, although the members of the Soviet High Command accepted the utility of the new doctrinal concepts, reality weighed against full realization of their dreams.
