ABSTRACT
On 1st October the Kings Dragoon Guards, the armoured carregiment of the 7th Armoured Division, entered Naples. This was the estimated date for the capture of Naples in the first plan made in July. At the time that the plan was made, however, it seemed more reasonable to suppose that that day would see us about to assault either Taranto or, in the worst case, Sardinia. At about the same time another event occurred which was to mould the future shape of the Italian campaign; Hitler suddenly decided to make a stand. Hitherto he had been content to withdraw slowly up the leg of Italy and he had already set irrevocably in motion the evacuation of Sardinia and Corsica. It was already becoming clear however that, tactically speaking, there was no real need to be in a hurry. The Italian change of side had passed off without much trouble, apart from a little wear and tear on the motor transport used in rounding up the Italian troops as prisoners of war—and the Germans had at last formed a better appreciation of the limitations of amphibious warfare. There were only about eight Allied divisions in Italy, as opposed to their own nineteen, and although they heavily overestimated, as always, the number of troops we had available in North Africa, they could see that it would be some time before we could transport to Italy any large forces. The Italian terrain was of course the most suitable for defence that could be found in the whole of Europe and it was only natural that Hider, who regarded any withdrawal as a sign of almost criminal weakness, should decide to make a stand. He accordingly issued orders that the German troops should establish a line south of Rome and endeavour to hold it for the rest of the winter.
