Eisenhower and the Sinai Campaign of 1956: The First Major Crisis in US–Israeli Relations
The most recent historical research on the Sinai War provides telling descriptions of the war as a coalition endeavour involving Britain, France and Israel. This chapter argues that the application of the agreement during the war demonstrated clearly, and to says the differences of motivation, the divergent interests. It gives the separate goals of each of the three nations that sent their armed forces into war. From many points of view the military collaboration was a moment of truth, when it was no longer possible to conceal the fact that each of the three ostensible partners had compartmentalized the other two. The communications between the three nations that were supposedly fighting shoulder-to-shoulder against Gamal Abdel Nassers Egypt were, at best, fraught with misunderstandings and half-truths. The chapter highlights the disparities between the three partners; the focuses on Israels perception of the military collaboration, though similar problems can also be identified with regard to both Britain and France.