ABSTRACT
Soviet preoccupation with nuclear war and the importance of strategy and the resulting eclipse of operational art had entirely eroded by 1970, as Soviet attention to operational art and operational techniques intensified. Enhanced concern for operational art, paralleled by Soviet restructuring of the armed forces to improve their operational capabilities, elevated the importance of that field from its relative positions of neglect in the early 1960s to a major area of concern in the 1970s. The Soviets agreed that the introduction of nuclear weapons had altered the development of operational art and changed the nature of operations. Consequently, they reinvestigated the key subject of the initial period of war, redefined traditional aspects of mass and concentration, and focused on the conduct of maneuver (both operational and tactical) designed to lessen the likelihood of nuclear weapons being used in future war and, if they were used, to lessen the effects of these weapons (particularly tactical nuclear weapons). Throughout the 1970s, Soviet study of maneuver focused on anti-nuclear [protivoyadernyy] maneuver and culminated in development of the twin concepts of the theater-strategic offensive and operational maneuver by operational maneuver groups (OMGs). Against this backdrop, Soviet writings on all aspects of operational art and operational maneuver broadened and intensified.
